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A NEW DEAL FOR DEBTORS: PROVIDING 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN CONSUMER 
BANKRUPTCY 
PAMELA FOOHEY* 
Abstract: Across the criminal and civil justice systems, research regarding pro-
cedural justice shows that people’s positive perceptions of legal processes are 
fundamental to the legal system’s effectiveness and to the rule of law. Approxi-
mately one million people file bankruptcy every year, making the consumer 
bankruptcy system the part of the federal court system with which the public 
most often comes into contact. Given the importance of bankruptcy to American 
families and the credit economy, there should exist a rich literature theorizing and 
investigating how people’s perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s procedures ad-
vance the system’s goals. Instead, bankruptcy’s procedures have received strik-
ingly little scholarly attention. This Article begins to fill this significant gap by 
combining procedural justice and related research with what is known about the 
people who file bankruptcy to craft a theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedur-
al deficiencies. If consumer bankruptcy is procedurally bankrupt, as this Article 
posits, then the “fresh start” delivered to struggling households is not nearly as 
fresh as presumed, hampering people’s return to their communities and to the 
credit economy. As such, this Article proposes two sets of changes to the con-
sumer bankruptcy process—one modest and one more drastic. Both of these new 
deals for debtors promise to enhance people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s proce-
dural justice and thereby the legitimacy of the system. 
INTRODUCTION 
Processes and procedures matter. In law, procedures really matter. Proce-
dures protect individuals’ rights,1 and procedural missteps can result in the ex-
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pulsion of an entire case from the legal system.2 Such results deliver order and 
convey integrity. Research shows that across the criminal and civil justice sys-
tem, litigants value process and are more likely to respect courts’ decisions 
when they think that the courts settled their disputes by way of a fair method, 
even if they do not agree with the decisions.3 
In particular, people benefit from legal proceedings’ ability to allow them 
to face their accusers, confront wrongdoers, and engage in “deliberative inter-
action” with their communities and with society.4 Courtroom hearings, arbitra-
tion proceedings, and mediations let individuals “vent their feelings, present 
their side of the story,” and discuss “what can be done to restore a sense of jus-
tice.”5 This interaction is part of what is termed the “expressive value” of law 
and legal proceedings,6 which connects with people’s perceptions of their 
standing within society7 and with their emotional reactions to major life 
events.8 
“Procedural justice”—feeling that one has a voice, is respected, and is be-
fore a neutral and even-handed adjudicator—thereby brings legitimacy to the 
legal system,9 leading some to argue that legal procedures are more important 
                                                                                                                           
 1 For example, criminal procedures include the right to trial by jury, to counsel, and to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1998) (noting doctrines of criminal procedure). 
 2 An interesting example is the City of Harrisburg’s chapter 9 bankruptcy case. After the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed the City’s petition for failure to meet 
the Bankruptcy Code’s eligibility requirements to be a chapter 9 debtor, the City filed an appeal with 
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, but missed the filing deadline by three 
days. The District Court dismissed the appeal. City of Harrisburg, Pa. v. AFSCME Dist. Council 90, 
No. 1:11-BK-06938MDF, 2012 WL 315403 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012). 
 3 See generally Edgar Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authori-
ties, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177 (Austin Sarat et al. eds. 1998) (discussing 
procedural justice); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94–112 (1990) (noting how peo-
ple’s experiences during proceedings influence perceptions of legitimacy). 
 4 Michael Wenzel et al., Retributive and Restorative Justice, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 375, 376–
77 (2008). 
 5 See id.; infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text (discussing voice and perceptions of proce-
dural justice). 
 6 See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1363, 1414–27 (2000) (overviewing the expressive dimensions of law); infra notes 120–206 and ac-
companying text. 
 7 People naturally view themselves as occupying a distinct position within society’s social 
groups, and people’s social identity can yield a sense of belonging, pride, and self-esteem. See Henri 
Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65, 69 (1974) (discussing social 
identity); Tom Tyler et al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of 
the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 913, 
913–14 (1996) (noting that people seek to be well-regarded group members); infra notes 120–140 and 
accompanying text (discussing social standing and the legal system). 
 8 See infra notes 141–206 (discussing the emerging field of law and emotions). 
 9 Procedural justice generally refers to the perceived fairness of procedures. See Tyler et al., su-
pra note 7, at 914 (defining procedural justice). See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE 
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than substantive law.10 At the very least, research shows that procedural justice 
is crucial to the rule of law and fundamental to the legal system’s operation 
and effectiveness.11 
The bankruptcy system is an integral part of the American legal system. 
About one million people file consumer bankruptcy every year.12 Cumulative-
ly, these cases seek to discharge billions of dollars in debts and to grant a 
“fresh start” to the individuals and families who file that hopefully will allow 
them to regain their financial footing and re-enter the credit economy.13 Based 
on the number of petitions filed each year, the consumer bankruptcy system is 
by far the part of the federal court system with which people most often come 
into contact.14 Likewise, every year, thousands of larger corporations and small 
businesses seek to use the bankruptcy system to reorganize, with the hope of 
curing defaults, getting back on track, and preserving value and jobs.15 
Given the importance of the bankruptcy system to American families and 
to the economy, there should exist a rich literature theorizing and empirically 
investigating how people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedures advance the 
bankruptcy system’s goals. Yet the procedures that govern bankruptcy cases 
have received strikingly little scholarly attention. Procedural justice theory has 
                                                                                                                           
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (providing an overview of factors that lead 
people to assess procedures as fair); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (establishing the foundations of procedural justice). 
 10 See Jeremy Lever, Why Procedure Is More Important Than Substantive Law, 48 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 285, 285 (1999) (arguing that procedural rules affect the outcome of cases more than 
substantive law). 
 11 See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psycho-
logical Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 666–68 (2007) (linking the rule 
of law to procedural justice). 
 12 U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES [hereinafter CASELOAD STATISTICS], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/BK3N-
4XRL]. This rough estimate is based on nonbusiness bankruptcy cases commenced between 2008 and 
2017, as reported in Table F-2. Nonbusiness bankruptcy filings peaked in 2010 at about 1.5 million 
and steadily declined to a low of approximately 765,000 in 2017. See id. (providing consumer bank-
ruptcy filing numbers). 
 13 The phrase “fresh start” comes from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See 
infra notes 20–27 and accompanying text (discussing why people are granted the discharge). 
 14 See CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12 (detailing the number of people filing for consumer 
bankruptcy). Every year, the number of bankruptcy cases filed is about twice the number of other 
cases filed in federal court. See generally U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics [https://
perma.cc/4ZKU-DAH4]. 
 15 For example, there were 6,350 business chapter 11 filings in 2017. CASELOAD STATISTICS, 
supra note 12. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776–77, 787–89 
(1987) (discussing competing theories of business bankruptcy). 
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only recently begun to be applied to bankruptcy, and it appears that the theory 
has been applied only in the business bankruptcy context.16 
That consumer bankruptcy’s procedures have remained unanalyzed from 
a procedural justice perspective is a serious oversight. The individuals who file 
bankruptcy may be more likely than business debtors to look to their cases’ 
processes and outcomes to assess their place in society and to deal with emo-
tions arising from serious events in their lives that contributed to their need to 
file. Research shows that consumer debtors overwhelmingly identify as mid-
dle-class, struggle to pay their debts for years before they turn to bankruptcy, 
are severely overindebted when they file, report being pushed to file by credi-
tors’ and debt collectors’ actions, and state that they felt shame for needing to 
file.17 Once they muster the strength to file, these people may look to their cas-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See generally Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 2533 Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
56–67 (2011) (statement of Melissa B. Jacoby discussing venue laws applicable to chapter 11 cases); 
Pamela Foohey, Jevic’s Promise: Procedural Justice in Chapter 11, 93 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 128 
(2018), http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1845/93WLRO128.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W98N-P2M2] (detailing how a recent Supreme Court decision may be relied on by 
bankruptcy judges to provide more procedural justice in chapter 11); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate 
Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2018) (noting issues of procedural justice in chapter 
11 cases filed by large corporations); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Re-
organization After Jevic, 93 WASH. L. REV. 631 (2018) (arguing that a recent Supreme Court decision 
has severe implications for process in addition to substantive corporate bankruptcy law). Literature 
about consent and control in chapter 11 also is related to issues of process and procedural justice. See, 
e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
663 (2009) (discussing consent in the context of bankruptcy); Diane Lourdes Dick, The Bearish Bank-
ruptcy, 52 GA. L. REV. 437 (2018) (exploring the use of debtor-in-possession financing to gain control 
of restructuring and shut out other stakeholders); Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency 
Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759 (critiquing chapter 11’s emphasis on speed and efficiency); Melissa 
B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018) (discussing value-allocation in bankruptcy); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. 
Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1857 
(2019) (discussing how the market for bankruptcy claims affects procedure in chapter 11); Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 931 (2004) (arguing that bankruptcy is a type of civil procedure); Jay Lawrence West-
brook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 (2004) (discussing creditor control 
in the recovery process). Scholars also have discussed the importance of process to value maximiza-
tion in chapter 11. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2007) (finding that recoveries in bankruptcy reorganizations were significantly 
higher than those in going concern sales); Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 
93 KY. L.J. 839 (2004) (criticizing the “control rights” theory of modern chapter 11 bankruptcies); 
Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 728 (2010) (argu-
ing that the Chrysler bankruptcy did not constitute good bankruptcy practice). 
 17 See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, Life in the 
Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219, 225–26, 236–41 (2018) [hereinafter Foohey et al., Sweat-
box] (detailing how long people spend struggling with debts prior to filing bankruptcy and their paths 
to filing); infra notes 56–89 and accompanying text. For this Article’s purposes, overindebted means 
an “inability to repay all debts in full in the near future.” A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, 
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es, in part, as a way to publicly confirm their self-worth.18 Indeed, if consumer 
debtors did not expect their cases to speak to their standing within society, 
their perceptions of the bankruptcy system would differ starkly from people’s 
views of every other part of the American legal system. 
This Article seeks to fill the gap in the literature by combining procedural 
justice theory and related research with what is known about the people who 
file bankruptcy to evaluate the state of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural jus-
tice and, based on this assessment, to propose changes to consumer bankrupt-
cy’s procedures to strengthen its capacity to achieve the system’s goals. Cur-
rent literature about consumer bankruptcy’s mechanics focuses almost exclu-
sively on why people should be afforded a discharge of most of their debts—
that is, the system’s goals.19 But if people do not receive what they expect from 
the bankruptcy process, they may not maximize the discharge’s theorized ben-
efits, meaning that the system may not function as expected and may be in 
need of revisions. 
The most pervasive justification for affording people a “fresh start” is that 
this relief allows them to remain economically productive members of socie-
ty.20 Bankruptcy’s discharge ensures that they continue working, spending, and 
borrowing, thereby promoting the credit economy.21 Importantly, this view of 
the bankruptcy process does not focus on how people’s experiences in bank-
ruptcy shape their view of themselves, and, concomitantly, the bankruptcy sys-
tem’s legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                           
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 396 n.1 
(2009). 
 18 See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text (discussing emotions and filing bankruptcy). 
 19 Not all debts are discharged in bankruptcy. See infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text. 
 20 Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 140, 148–53 (2004) 
(overviewing the competing justifications put forth for the consumer bankruptcy system). 
 21 See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYS-
TEM 99 (1997) (“[W]e want debtors to be able to continue borrowing if they put themselves in the 
position to be able to repay what they owe their creditors.”); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy 
Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 53 (2002) (“The fresh start policy prevents pau-
perism and idleness.”); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1047, 1085 (1987) (“[M]andating [conditional debt relief] comes down to a diminution of the 
goal of economic productivity.”); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1433 (1985) (describing the economic benefits of allowing people to discharge 
their debts in terms of human capital); Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankrupt-
cy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 68 (2006) (discussing the “new opportunity in life” that 
supposedly accompanies the fresh start); Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 492 (1997) (“[Americans] need the chance to remain produc-
tive members of society, not driven underground or into joblessness by unpayable debt.”). Relatedly, 
the bankruptcy process is viewed as an educational experience during which people acquire financial 
knowledge that will assist them in managing debts going forward. See Howard, supra, at 1060 (dis-
cussing bankruptcy as an educational tool). 
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The discharge also is seen as a form of social insurance. The bankruptcy 
system catches individuals who, because of an incomplete social safety net, 
have taken on debt to pay necessary expenses, such as healthcare.22 Similarly, 
shifting the risk of default to creditors should incentivize creditors to lend with 
more discretion, which will decrease the risk of default and, with it, consum-
ers’ use of bankruptcy.23 
Finally, some scholars have justified the “fresh start” on a humanitarian 
basis. Society’s sanctioning of a law that relieves debtors of burdensome debts 
evidences both creditors’ and society’s compassion and virtue.24 Forgiving 
debtors may have “restorative” benefits for creditors, debtors, and society 
broadly.25 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or 
Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1072–73 (2004) (linking social programs and the typical 
consumer who files bankruptcy to suggest that these people initially self-finance their safety nets with 
credit cards); Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129–31 (2005) (noting that bankruptcy is an “insurer of last resort”); 
Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and the Injured: The Rhetorical Significance, but 
Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 233–35 (2001) (de-
scribing bankruptcy as an important part of the health care finance system); Lois R. Lupica, The Con-
sumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 591 (2009) (“In 
the absence of savings, a living wage or public assistance, credit becomes what enables many families 
to survive.”). 
 23 See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 981–83 
(1981) (discussing discharge as allocating risk of loss between debtor and creditor); Jackson, supra 
note 21, at 1426 (noting that discharge “leaves the determination of whether to extend credit to credi-
tors . . . who are better able, by observing individual debtors or by employing specific contractual 
covenants, to monitor individuals’ consumption of credit”); John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for 
Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 431–34 (discussing why it is more efficient to 
shift risk of default to creditors). See generally Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375 
(2014) (defending the priority of tax claims in bankruptcy due, in part, to the fact that the government 
is less able to manage the risk of debtor default). 
 24 See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 21, at 93–94 (articulating the discharge as “forgiveness”); Heidi 
M. Hurd, The Virtue of Consumer Bankruptcy, in A DEBTOR WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPEC-
TIVES ON DEBT 217, 217–18 (Ralph Brubaker et al. eds., 2012) (articulating “a new positive theory” 
of the discharge that posits that debt forgiveness is “about achieving and expressing personal virtue—
not that of creditors or of debtors . . . but of our own, as citizens of a just and wealthy society”); Rich-
ard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for the Financial Rehabilitation of the 
Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 519–21 (1991) (positing that consumer bankruptcy 
law is grounded in a “natural law theory of morality” that combines “attributes of social, distributive, 
and commutative justice, existing in harmony as a humanitarian response to the financially downtrod-
den”); Jacoby, supra note 22, at 239 (noting the altruistic basis of the discharge). Thomas Jackson’s 
theories for the discharge of debts, premised on “volitional and cognitive justifications,” can be 
viewed in a humanitarian light: they are premised on the idea that debtors collectively would want 
society to allow them to be relieved from debts they incurred without fully thinking the deals through 
because of “impulse control” issues and cognitive defects. See generally Jackson, supra note 21, at 
1405–18 (discussing justifications for the discharge). 
 25 See GROSS, supra note 21, at 94 (linking forgiveness and restoration); see also Hurd, supra 
note 24, at 218 (“When debtors are rightly forgiven, it is under circumstances in which all those to 
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The humanitarian theory offers insights into the role of forgiveness in so-
ciety through the legal system that procedural justice and related theories con-
sider.26 Assessing procedural justice in the context of bankruptcy, however, 
requires additional focus on debtors. Also, applying procedural justice theory’s 
tenets to consumer debtors does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
debtors are “wrongdoers” who need the discharge’s forgiveness to “regain self-
esteem.”27 On the contrary, research about the people who file bankruptcy sug-
gests that some seek to assert their never lost self-esteem through their bank-
ruptcy cases.28 
More fundamentally, evaluating the consumer bankruptcy process 
through the lens of procedural justice and related theories does not seek to ex-
plain why bankruptcy provides the discharge. Rather, it explains what people 
expect to gain from the bankruptcy system, the receipt of which should en-
courage them to maximize the discharge’s benefits.29 Understanding how peo-
ple anticipate their bankruptcy cases will proceed is essential to knowing if the 
discharge actually is being used to produce its theorized benefits. By linking 
several strands of research relevant to, but previously not applied to, consumer 
bankruptcy, this Article describes a way in which people can benefit from 
bankruptcy that is not reflected in its procedures. This sets the stage for craft-
ing proposals to strengthen consumer bankruptcy’s procedures, which, in turn, 
should enhance how America’s credit economy operates. 
This Article’s examination of consumer bankruptcy’s procedures is de-
scriptive and normative. To situate the Article, Part I reviews consumer bank-
ruptcy’s mechanics and examines which people actually file bankruptcy. Part II 
sets forth the Article’s theoretical framework grounded in procedural justice 
theory and people’s expression of social standing and emotions through the 
legal system. It then applies this framework to consumer bankruptcy to analyze 
people’s perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedures. 
Part II concludes by asserting that consumer bankruptcy, in effect, is pro-
cedurally bankrupt. Its current procedures bear almost none of the hallmarks of 
                                                                                                                           
whom their debts are owed ought to forgive their debts, and all those to whom the costs of their de-
fault are passed ought to be willing to shoulder those losses.”). 
 26 See GROSS, supra note 21, at 98–103 (linking the discharge and theories of criminal law, par-
ticularly the restorative justice and dignity rationales). 
 27 Id. at 94. 
 28 See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text. 
 29 The theory developed in this Article is distinct from Donald Korobkin’s theory about how 
bankruptcy is performative, as put forth in Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2124 (2003). To the extent that this Article’s discussion draws on the performance inherent in 
legal proceedings, it does so in connection with the social benefits that debtors believe they will re-
ceive from the bankruptcy process, not what society requires of debtors. See id. at 2127–28 (discuss-
ing legal scholars’ exploration of performativity). 
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the legal processes that litigants and the public find to provide procedural jus-
tice, the opportunity to affirm social standing, and the chance to deal with the 
emotions that arise from legal problems. In addition, the profile of the people 
who file bankruptcy from Part I suggests that consumer debtors should highly 
value finding procedural integrity in bankruptcy. Participating in a process they 
view as procedurally deficient may negatively impact their motivation to make 
the most of their cases’ outcomes. 
In light of this conclusion, Part III proposes two “new deals” for consum-
er debtors that are designed to address the system’s procedural justice deficien-
cies. One proposal takes a more modest approach based on the idea that a few 
small changes to consumer bankruptcy’s procedures are more legislatively fea-
sible. The other proposal abandons the constraint of legislative feasibility and 
reimagines the consumer bankruptcy system. As a bonus, both proposals ad-
dress other long-standing problems with the consumer bankruptcy system that 
have hampered its ability to deliver the fresh start to struggling households. 
The Article closes by offering an empirical framework to further test consumer 
bankruptcy’s procedural justice. 
I. A PRIMER ON THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
People file bankruptcy based on what benefits they think the system will 
provide them. It is thus important to understand how the consumer bankruptcy 
system works and who files bankruptcy. This Part first provides a primer on 
the consumer bankruptcy system’s mechanics and then details research about 
who files bankruptcy.30 
A. How People Are Granted the Discharge 
Debtors initiate almost all consumer bankruptcy cases in the United 
States,31 and most consumer debtors file with the help of an attorney.32 Con-
sumers predominantly file under two “chapters” of the Bankruptcy Code: 
chapter 7 and chapter 13.33 Each of these chapters can be thought of as provid-
ing for a particular deal between debtors and their creditors. 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 31–89 and accompanying text. 
 31 See Foohey et al., supra note 17, at 226 (providing an overview of bankruptcy). 
 32 See id. at 229 (finding that 90.1% of all debtors in a sample of households who filed chapter 7 
or 13 between 2013 and 2016 employed an attorney to file their bankruptcy cases). 
 33 Consumers also may file chapter 11, which provides for reorganization of debts. See ELIZA-
BETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 294 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing con-
sumer chapter 11 filings). The vast majority of people file chapter 7 or 13. For example, in 2015, 
819,760 nonbusiness bankruptcy petitions were filed and 1,111 of them were chapter 11 petitions. See 
CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 12 (depicting bankruptcy petitions in 2015). The discussion thus 
focuses on chapters 7 and 13. 
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People who file chapter 7 receive a relatively speedy discharge of most of 
their debts in exchange for surrendering their assets to a bankruptcy trustee, 
who sells those assets and distributes the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors.34 
In practice, more than 90% of consumers’ chapter 7 cases are “no asset” cases, 
meaning that there are no assets for the trustee to sell.35 The reason for this is 
two-fold. First, because state law and the Code protect (“exempt”) certain as-
sets from liquidation, such as some clothing and household items, many debt-
ors are allowed to retain all of their assets to effectuate their fresh start.36 Sec-
ond, many people have pledged most of their assets as collateral to their credi-
tors; pledged (“secured”) assets are not available for liquidation by the bank-
ruptcy trustee.37 
Most debtors who file chapter 7 are granted a discharge within six months 
of filing and do not go to court or meet the bankruptcy judge.38 All debtors 
who file are required to sit for a hearing conducted by the bankruptcy trustee, 
however, during which the trustee questions them about their finances and 
creditors also may question the debtors.39 In both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cas-
es, bankruptcy trustees are almost always private attorneys who serve as trus-
tees through appointment to particular cases by the Department of Justice’s 
United States Trustee Program.40 This program also employs full-time attor-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen, & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bank-
ruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 394 (2012) (describing chapter 7). 
 35 See id. (defining “no asset” cases); Dalié Jiménez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009) (finding that 93% of people who 
filed under chapter 7 in 2007 entered bankruptcy with no distributable assets). 
 36 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2012) (listing federal exemptions); Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394 
(discussing exemptions). 
 37 See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394 (discussing secured creditors); Jiménez, supra note 
35, at 801 (noting that “[s]ecured creditors are the real winners in the bankruptcy game”). 
 38 See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394, 425 n.12 (describing chapter 7 and noting that bank-
ruptcy judges only conduct hearings when disputes arise); Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An 
Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 153 (2011) [hereinafter Porter, The 
Pretend Solution] (noting that the chapter 7 discharge rate exceeds 95%). 
 39 See 11 U.S.C. § 343 (requiring debtors to attend the hearing); Katherine Porter, Driven by 
Debt: Bankruptcy and Financial Failure in American Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS 
THE MIDDLE CLASS 1, 1–2 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) [hereinafter Porter, Driven by Debt] (describ-
ing this hearing). 
 40 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVATE TRUSTEE INFORMATION [hereinafter PRIVATE TRUSTEE IN-
FORMATION], https://www.justice.gov/ust/private-trustee-information [https://perma.cc/EJ6X-NNNZ] 
(describing the role of private trustees in the bankruptcy system); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. TRUSTEE 
PROGRAM, https://www.justice.gov/ust [https://perma.cc/7999-Z2XZ] (describing the U.S. Trustee 
Program). In the six judicial districts of Alabama and North Carolina, bankruptcy administrators simi-
larly oversee the administration of chapter 7 and 13 cases. See U.S. COURTS, TRUSTEES AND ADMIN-
ISTRATORS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/trustees-and-administrators [https://
perma.cc/4JKD-PUAK] (discussing bankruptcy administrators). Because these administrators’ duties 
are substantively similar to private trustees’ roles, this Article’s discussion of chapter 7 and 14 trustees 
includes bankruptcy administrators. 
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neys, known as United States Trustees, who supervise private trustees and en-
sure the bankruptcy system’s overall efficiency and integrity.41 
The hearings during which trustees question debtors are called the “meet-
ing[s] with creditors” or “341 meetings” after the controlling Code section.42 
They are recorded, may be remembered by debtors “as one of the most painful 
moments of their lives,”43 and are the foremost means by which debtors tell the 
story of how they ended up in bankruptcy. These meetings effectively are con-
sumer debtors’ “day in court.” 
In contrast, chapter 13 is a lengthy and more complicated proceeding. In 
exchange for a discharge of most of their debts, people must devote all of their 
disposable income for three to five years to paying their creditors through a 
repayment plan approved by the bankruptcy court.44 Debtors receive the dis-
charge only after they make all payments required under the plan.45 Like debt-
ors who file chapter 7, chapter 13 debtors are unlikely to go to court or meet 
the bankruptcy judge. Instead, their attorneys handle the court hearings. These 
debtors’ day in court also is the 341 meeting, which proceeds in the same way 
as in a chapter 7 case.46 
People may file chapter 13 for a variety of reasons. Chief among these 
reasons is that chapter 13 allows debtors to retain all their assets, regardless of 
whether those assets are exempt or secured,47 such as their homes.48 
The Code also moderates access to chapters 7 and 13, in part to assure 
that only honest but unfortunate debtors are afforded a fresh start.49 Following 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See PRIVATE TRUSTEE INFORMATION, supra note 40 (describing the role of private trustees in 
the bankruptcy system). 
 42 See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (requiring and describing the meeting with creditors). 
 43 Porter, Driven by Debt, supra note 39, at 2; see Nathalie Martin, Poverty, Culture and the 
Bankruptcy Code: Narratives from the Money Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 203, 214 (2005) 
(describing the palpable nervousness and shame of people seeking to file bankruptcy). 
 44 See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 394 (describing chapter 13). 
 45 See id. 
 46 11 U.S.C. § 341; see Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 117–18 (discussing the 
mechanics of chapter 13, including the role of the bankruptcy trustee). 
 47 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 395 (“It is widely believed among consumer bankruptcy 
specialists that a client’s desire to save a home is the most common reason for filing Chapter 13 
. . . .”); Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter, & Deborah Thorne, “No Money Down” 
Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1063 n.37 (2017) [hereinafter Foohey et al., “No Money 
Down”] (explaining when debtors may retain encumbered property in chapter 7); Porter, The Pretend 
Solution, supra note 38, at 133–36 (reporting that almost 90% of chapter 13 debtors indicated that 
keeping their house was a very important goal when filing for bankruptcy, and that, for over 50% of 
the debtors, it was their most important goal). 
 49 The Code’s provisions regarding access to bankruptcy can be viewed as a response to the 
“moral hazard” problem that accompanies lending. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving 
Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 293 (2010) (discussing how credit economies rely on debtors’ 
promises that they will pay back funds extended and how the law must incentivize repayment). 
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the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005 (BAPCPA),50 the Code does this by using a “means test” that evaluates 
a debtor’s ability to repay creditors based on monthly income, expenses, and 
outstanding debts.51 If the means test’s formula deems a debtor’s monthly in-
come less expenses sufficient to repay a large enough portion of outstanding 
debts, the debtor must file chapter 13 or not at all.52 Although one of the stated 
purposes of the means test is to curtail perceived abuses of bankruptcy by peo-
ple who supposedly could pay their debts by requiring these debtors to file 
chapter 13,53 it has not resulted in a shift in the relative percentage of house-
holds filing chapter 7 and 13.54 Section B explains the reasons for this by de-
tailing exactly which individuals and families file bankruptcy.55 
B. Who Files Bankruptcy? 
The means test and other provisions of BAPCPA that made bankruptcy 
more expensive and time consuming were enacted in response to popular con-
ceptions of when and why people file bankruptcy.56 BAPCPA’s proponents 
painted a picture of profligate and cunning consumers who filed “bankruptcies 
of convenience” after racking up unwarranted expenses that they never intend-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 707, 
119 Stat. 23 (2005). BAPCA had an effective date of October 17, 2005. Id. 
 51 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2012). 
 52 See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer 
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352–53 (2008) (discussing the means test); Porter, The Pretend 
Solution, supra note 38, at 119 (providing further analysis on the means test); Charles Jordan Tabb, 
The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 1–2 (2001) 
(foreseeing that BAPCPA would leave debtors with “the Hobson’s choice of foregoing bankruptcy 
relief altogether or attempting to ‘repay their creditors . . .’ in a chapter 13 repayment plan”). 
 53 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 135, 144–45 (2008) (noting that BAPCPA evidences a policy closer to the “concept of an 
‘earned’ rather than ‘fresh’ start”); Lawless et al., supra note 52, at 351–52, 378 (discussing which 
debtors BAPCPA’s means test was meant to target); infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 116, 119 (overviewing filing statistics). 
 55 See infra notes 56–89 and accompanying text. 
 56 See Angela Littwin, Adapting to BAPCPA, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 183, 183–87 (2016) (overview-
ing BAPCPA’s changes to the Bankruptcy Code that “appeared likely to impair the consumer bank-
ruptcy system’s ability to function”); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final 
Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 27 (2012) (noting BAPCPA’s goals). 
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ed to pay.57 Proponents linked supposed strategic filings to a purported drastic 
decline in bankruptcy’s stigma.58 
For example, as synthesized by Mechele Dickerson, the typical filer is 
nothing short of a “bankruptcy queen”— 
the owner of a multi-million dollar exempt mansion, [who] charges 
lavish trinkets on a Visa card (or takes a cash advance from the cred-
it card to fund a gambling trip to Reno), then cavalierly files for 
bankruptcy rather than selling the exempt assets, curtailing spending 
habits, or working to repay the credit card debt.59 
Those who championed this characterization went so far as to claim that the 
“rising tide of bankruptcy filings” caused by this cavalier spending cost every 
hardworking, billpaying, upstanding family $400 a year.60 
None of the claims made by BAPCPA’s supporters were substantiated by 
evidence, including the claims that bankruptcy’s stigma had declined,61 and 
that rising filings cost every family $400 annually.62 Rather, decades of empir-
ical research about the people who file bankruptcy show that most people turn 
to bankruptcy for help after experiencing shocks to income or expenses, with 
job loss, divorce, and medical expenses underlying the vast majority of fil-
ings.63 Most of these data come from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 375, 376–77, 391 (discussing debates about BAPCPA); see also Foohey et al., Sweatbox, 
supra note 17, at 229–32 (discussing the debates leading up to BAPCPA); Katherine Porter, Bankrupt 
Profits: The Credit Industry’s Business Model for Postbankruptcy Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 
1371–78 (2008) (overviewing the “strategic behavior” model of bankruptcy and the debates that led to 
BAPCPA’s passage). 
 58 See A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1861, 1891–92 (2006) (noting that BAPCPA’s supporters “suggest[] that debtors 
lacked integrity because they no longer felt any personal obligation to pay debts they could afford to 
repay”); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 214 (2006) (“The primary 
justification for this wholesale revision of the accessibility of the consumer bankruptcy system has 
been the repeated claim that the extraordinary increase in bankruptcy filings is the consequence of 
declining stigma.”). 
 59 A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 17, 48–49 (1999). 
 60 Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77, 77 (2004) [hereinafter 
Warren, Phantom]. 
 61 See Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 
463–79 (2013) (interviewing people who filed chapter 7 about bankruptcy’s stigma); Sullivan et al., 
supra note 58, at 218 (arguing that bankruptcy’s stigma likely increased, not decreased, over time). 
 62 Warren, Phantom, supra note 60, at 77, 79–80. 
 63 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 2 
(2000) (noting that five sources of financial stress lead to bankruptcy); ELIZABETH WARREN & AME-
LIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE 
GOING BROKE 81 (2003) (“Nearly nine out of ten families with children cite just three reasons for 
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the long-term, multi-researcher effort that investigates the people who file 
bankruptcy.64 
Data from the CBP further show that the households that file bankruptcy 
predominately are middle-class, based on education, occupation, and home 
ownership, even if their current incomes are not consistent with middle-class 
status.65 What distinguishes households that file bankruptcy from their non-
filing counterparts is debt and an accompanying lack of resources to deal with 
debts. In the CBP’s latest iteration, the median household entered bankruptcy 
with a little over $100,000 in debts, compared to a median monthly income of 
about $2,650.66 Assuming (unrealistically) that these households committed all 
of their income to repaying their debts, it would take them about two and a half 
years to do so.67 
CBP data also have long shown that people struggle to pay their debts for 
years before they turn to bankruptcy courts for help. The CBP asks debtors: 
“Before you filed bankruptcy, how long did you seriously struggle with your 
debts?”68 In the latest iteration, which includes people who filed between 2013 
and 2016, two-thirds of households reported struggling with their debts for two 
or more years, and almost one-third (30%) reported struggling for five or more 
years.69 On average, people reported that they struggled for more than three 
years before filing.70 
Additionally, the length of people’s pre-bankruptcy struggles has in-
creased. In the CBP’s prior iteration, which included debtors who filed in 
                                                                                                                           
their bankruptcies: job loss, family breakup, and medical problems.”); Lawless et al., supra note 52, at 
378–79 (discussing whether post-BAPCPA filing data support the “strategic actor” vision of debtors 
or the view that “exogenous shocks” drive filings). 
 64 Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook launched the CBP in the 
1980s. See Robert M. Lawless & Angela Littwin, Local Legal Culture from R2D2 to Big Data, 96 
TEX. L. REV. 1353, 1353–54 (2018) (discussing the CBP). The other co-principal investigators on the 
CBP’s current iteration are Robert Lawless, Katherine Porter, and Deborah Thorne. For details about 
the CBP, see Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48, at 1071–74 (discussing the origin of 
the CBP). I am a co-principal investigator on the CBP’s current iteration. 
 65 See Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class: Bankruptcy and Class 
Status, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 25, 36–38 (Katherine Porter ed., 
2012) (“People in bankruptcy . . . reflect a class status that is much like their [middle-class] counter-
parts around the country.”); Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 234–35; Lars Lefgren & Frank 
McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 
367, 370 (2009) (noting that consumer bankruptcy filing rates “are most common in zip codes with 
many households with incomes between $30,000 and $60,000”—that is, the middle class). 
 66 See Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 234–35 (describing the lengthy struggles of 
debtors in the “sweatbox”). 
 67 This calculation is based on the debt-to-income ratio of people in the CBP’s current iteration. 
See id. at 239 tbl.1. 
 68 Id. at 235–36. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 236. 
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2007, households reported struggling for an average of just under two and a 
half years.71 In the span of just one decade, people have indicated that they 
waited ten months longer to file bankruptcy.72 And this is a continuation of a 
trend. In the CBP’s iteration in 2001, about one-third of debtors indicated that 
they struggled for two or more years prior to filing bankruptcy.73 
In short, people do not file soon after experiencing the financial shocks 
that ultimately land them in bankruptcy court. During the years that they try to 
pay their mounting debts, CBP data show that the people who eventually file 
bankruptcy try to work with their creditors by selling or pawning property to 
pay their debts. These people also go without necessities, such as food, utili-
ties, and, perhaps most concerningly, medical attention and other healthcare-
related expenses.74 While they struggle, they report enduring sleepless nights 
and arguments with spouses about how to deal with their financial situations.75 
Also, a majority of debtors indicate that pressure from debt collectors in-
fluenced their eventual filings.76 The longer people report struggling, the more 
likely they are to say that pressure from debt collectors pushed them to file 
bankruptcy.77 Among those people who struggle with their debts for two or 
more years, more than 80% cite pressure from debt collectors as a reason for 
their filings.78 And the longer people struggle, the more likely they are to arrive 
in bankruptcy court with a lien attached to their real property79 or to have an 
actual debt collection action filed against them before filing.80 Still, when peo-
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at 236–37. 
 72 Id. at 236. 
 73 Id. at 237. The increase in time that people report struggling between the 2001 and 2007 itera-
tions of the CBP likely is connected in large part to BAPCPA’s enactment. See Lawless et al., supra 
note 52, at 353 (noting that the means test effectively was “a barricade, blocking out hundreds of 
thousands of struggling families indiscriminately”). 
 74 Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 241–44. 
 75 See Deborah Thorne, Women’s Work, Women’s Worry? Debt Management in Financially Dis-
tressed Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 136, 136–38, 140–43, 151–
52 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (investigating how debt is experienced as more stressful by women); 
Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 142–44 (noting that “[b]y the time they file bankrupt-
cy, debtors have often endured months of dunning and threats of legal action,” and discussing how 
that causes stress and arguments). 
 76 Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 245–46. 
 77 Id. at 246. 
 78 See id. at 245 tbl.4 (reporting that 81.2% of debtors who struggled for more than two years 
prior to filing, versus 69.7% of debtors who struggled for less than two years, cited pressure from debt 
collectors as a reason for their bankruptcy filings). 
 79 See id. at 239 tbl.1 (reporting that 66.4% of debtors who struggled for more than two years 
prior to filing, versus 50.9% of other debtors who struggled for less than two years and who owned 
homes, arrived at bankruptcy court with an involuntary lien against their home). 
 80 See id. (reporting that 50.3% of debtors who struggled for more than two years prior to filing, 
versus 35.6% of other debtors, had a collection action filed against them prior to filing). 
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ple, particularly those who struggle the longest, eventually turned to bankrupt-
cy courts for help, about 65% indicate that they felt shame upon filing.81 
Nationwide on average, two-thirds of households file chapter 7 and one-
third file chapter 13.82 The reason that these percentages have remained steady 
through BAPCPA’s passage and the introduction of the means test relates in 
large part to the financial situations of households that file bankruptcy. Based 
on the means test, almost 90% of debtors who file chapter 13 are eligible to 
file chapter 7.83 
Research shows that the chapter a household files has to do with the cul-
ture of filings in the debtor’s judicial district,84 the debtor’s race,85 and when 
the debtor must pay attorney’s fees.86 Tellingly, interviews with debtors reveal 
that many do not even consider the trade-offs between filing chapter 7 and 
chapter 13.87 
Bankruptcy thus is a “last refuge” for stressed and struggling individuals 
and families, and filing is not a carefully thought out, long-planned decision.88 
Instead, declining income, selling property, dealing with debt collection calls, 
being sued over delinquent debts, watching involuntary liens attach to homes, 
and managing stress converge prior to people’s bankruptcy filings. Accounting 
for these dynamics is key to evaluating what people expect from the bankrupt-
cy system’s procedures. The next Part combines this knowledge about the peo-
ple who file bankruptcy with research about what people seek from the legal 
system to assess consumer bankruptcy’s procedures.89 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See id. at 249 (finding that 71.1% of debtors who report struggling with debts for two or more 
years, versus 61.8% of other debtors, indicated that they felt shame upon filing bankruptcy). 
 82 See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 396 (reporting that the 2010 national average of chapter 
13 petitions was 31.7% of all bankruptcy petitions); Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48, 
at 1063 n.36 (noting that 34.4% of the sampled cases filed in 2013–2014 were chapter 13 cases). 
 83 See ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., supra note 33, at 258, 276–80 (discussing the means test and 
chapter 7 eligibility). 
 84 For instance, in 2010, the percentage of consumers who filed under chapter 7 versus 13 varied 
drastically across the United States, from a low of 4.9% filing under chapter 13 to a high of 74.1% 
filing under chapter 13. See Braucher et al., supra note 34, at 396 (discussing these statistics). Schol-
ars link these variances to “local legal culture.” Id. at 395–97. 
 85 See generally id. (establishing that black debtors are more likely to file chapter 13 than other 
similarly situated debtors); Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathol-
ogies, 173 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 174 (2017) (finding that black households in 
Chicago are more likely to file chapter 13, in part because of parking tickets). 
 86 See generally Foohey et al., “No Money Down,” supra note 48 (finding that some debtors 
appear to file under chapter 13 because they can pay attorney’s fees over time rather than upfront and 
linking that outcome to racial disparities in regional chapter 13 filing rates). 
 87 See Porter, The Pretend Solution, supra note 38, at 119 (noting that of interviewed debtors who 
file under chapter 13, “only about half (47%) of all debtors even considered Chapter 7”). 
 88 See Foohey et al., Sweatbox, supra note 17, at 255 (finding that bankruptcy is not a “first re-
sort” for debtors). 
 89 See infra notes 90–224 and accompanying text. 
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II. IS CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURALLY BANKRUPT? 
The legal system’s procedures carry meanings, in part providing ways for 
people to assert their identities. Procedures shape people’s confidence in 
courts, their willingness to defer to judicial decisions, and their view of their 
place in communities and society. This Part applies the lessons of procedural 
justice, the expressive function of procedures, and the emotions surrounding 
legal proceedings to the consumer bankruptcy system.90 Through this analysis, 
this Article crafts a theory of how the people who seek bankruptcy protection 
view the system that they turn to for help. How consumer debtors experience 
bankruptcy courts almost certainly affects how they enter the credit economy 
after bankruptcy, which in turn impacts the economy as a whole. 
Section A introduces how people’s perceptions of legal procedures’ integ-
rity shape their view of legal proceedings. It then applies those insights to as-
sess whether people will find their bankruptcy cases procedurally sound.91 Af-
ter concluding that consumer bankruptcy’s current procedures lack the hall-
marks of procedural justice, Section B turns to research about how people use 
the legal system to confirm their social standing and to deal with their emo-
tional reactions to problems. This allows for an assessment of whether the 
faults in consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice impact people’s motivation 
to strengthen their financial positions after emerging from bankruptcy. This 
Section concludes that bankruptcy’s procedures likely matter greatly to the 
people who file.92 Finally, Section C draws upon my interviews with people 
who placed their small businesses in bankruptcy to provide some empirical 
evidence that supports my conclusion that consumer bankruptcy presently is 
procedurally bankrupt.93 
A. Assessing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Procedures 
1. The Value of Legal Process 
In the legal system, processes take on extra significance. Litigants often 
are as or more concerned about a proceeding’s perceived fairness than its ulti-
mate outcome.94 That people care deeply about the process by which their cas-
es and problems are handled, apart from the product of that process, may seem 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See infra notes 94–224 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 94–119 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 207–224 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 132 (2011) (noting that research has “provided robust empirical evidence that 
individuals care deeply about the fairness of the process by which decisions are made, apart from 
considerations about the outcome of the decision”); supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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counterintuitive. But study after study has found that people place a high value 
on procedural justice.95 
People’s perceptions of procedural justice influence how they think about 
and whether they accept the outcomes of legal proceedings. If people view the 
procedure that led to the outcome as fair, they are more likely to be satisfied 
with the outcome and adhere to it going forward, even if the outcome is unfa-
vorable to them.96 Similarly, when people perceive legal procedures as just, 
they also are more likely to view the institution that adjudicated the outcome as 
legitimate.97 This is not to say that people are indifferent to a proceeding’s out-
come. Rather, believing that one received fair treatment influences that per-
son’s willingness to accept the proceeding’s outcome independent of the effect 
that the proceeding’s fairness had on the outcome.98 
Assessments of procedural justice hinge on several aspects of the process: 
whether people (1) believe that they had a voice and chance to be heard, (2) 
perceive that they were treated with dignity and respect, (3) feel that the deci-
sionmaker sincerely considered their case, and (4) observe the forum as neutral 
and even-handed.99 The opportunity to be heard—that is, participation—is the 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 132–34 (providing an overview of these studies); 
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119 (2000) (dis-
cussing these studies). 
 96 See, e.g., LIND & TYLER, supra note 9, at 66–83 (discussing how people evaluate outcomes); 
TYLER, supra note 3, at 94–112 (discussing how people’s experiences during legal proceedings influ-
ence their perceptions of outcomes’ legitimacy); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Proce-
dural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 1, 3–4 (overviewing social psychology research about the effects of people’s percep-
tions of procedural justice); Tyler, supra note 11, at 664–65 (“Studies show that people continue to 
adhere to fair decisions over time . . . .”). 
 97 See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 3, at 161–63 (discussing “the procedural basis of legitimacy”); 
Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 134 (noting research that “procedural justice is an important 
component of individuals’ judgments about” legal systems’ legitimacy); Tyler, supra note 11, at 664–
70 (providing an overview of research that identifies “procedural justice and trust as the key anteced-
ents of the willingness to defer to legal authorities”). 
 98 See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 96, at 5 (“[P]rocedural justice has a separate and 
independent effect on how people feel about their results, apart from how fair or how good the out-
come is.”). Because research is interested in people’s perceptions of procedural justice, it necessarily 
focuses on individuals’ subjective perceptions of fairness, rather than what system architects anticipat-
ed to be the processes’ effects. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 134 (noting this focus). 
 99 See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 138–43 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992) (providing 
an overview of these four factors); Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 135 (noting that these four 
factors are often cited); Tyler, supra note 11, at 665 (outlining four elements, “participation, neutrali-
ty, treatment with dignity and respect, and trust in authorities,” that “generally shape reactions to 
courts”). See generally THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 9 (establishing the foundations of procedural 
justice). 
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most important factor in people’s assessments of procedural justice.100 Believ-
ing that one has a voice affects evaluations of respect, trust in authorities, and 
neutrality.101 Feeling heard includes speaking for oneself or being present 
while an attorney speaks on one’s behalf.102 The opportunity for participation 
is so crucial that the positive effects of feeling heard can accrue even when 
people understand that their participation will have little effect on the ultimate 
ruling.103 
People also are concerned with the trustworthiness of the authorities over-
seeing the adjudicatory process.104 An authority’s legitimacy turns on whether 
the authority is perceived to act in a fair manner, which again relates to a liti-
gant’s opinion about the judicial process’s fairness.105 Importantly, trust in au-
thorities intersects with people’s perceptions about what a proceeding’s out-
come conveys about their social standing.106 
Finally, the four factors people rely on to assess whether they received 
procedural justice in their own dealings with the judicial system also are the 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 135 (linking participation with control and 
noting that “perceptions about control over process are an important determinant of whether people 
feel that procedural justice has occurred”); Tyler, supra note 11, at 663 (noting the importance of 
having a “day in court”); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access 
to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 487–89 (2010) (reporting that 
voice has the “strongest influence”). 
 101 See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 4 
(2016) (noting the importance of “[t]he opportunity to recount one’s own story of an injury” in con-
junction with procedural justice and the tort system); Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 96, at 5–
6 (linking trust with having a voice); Lind, supra note 3, at 179–81 (observing that people care about 
voice because they want to know that the decisionmaker is fully informed, which influences the trust 
in authorities necessary for people to accept the ultimate decision). 
 102 See Donna Shestowksy, The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate 
Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 673–78 (2014) (discussing litigants’ preferences for 
participation of attorneys); Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from 
Empirical Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 447–50 (2010) (discussing relationships among 
voice, participation, and acceptance of outcomes in mediations). 
 103 See Tyler, supra note 95, at 121 (noting that having a voice allows people to feel they are 
participating). See generally E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumen-
tal and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 
(1990) (discussing the results of a research study into the role of participation in subjective feelings of 
fairness). Nonetheless, if people believe they are being manipulated, they may respond with “extreme-
ly negative reactions.” Lind, supra note 3, at 187. 
 104 See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Mo-
tive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF 
THEORY AND RESEARCH 331, 333–34 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) (discussing 
how trust in authorities is “the strongest predictor of evaluations of the fairness of decision-making 
procedures” and impacts people’s acceptance of decisions). 
 105 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 137–38 (linking an authority’s legitimacy with the 
process’s perceived fairness). 
 106 See id. (linking an authority’s legitimacy with litigants’ dignity and social standing). 
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four key factors that the general public uses to assess courts as institutions.107 
That is, the public stakes its faith in legal institutions’ decisions, in part, on 
procedure: whether they believe that courts allow for participation, respectful 
treatment, even-handed consideration, and neutrality.108 
2. Consumer Bankruptcy’s Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice is important for two main reasons applicable to con-
sumer bankruptcy. First, proceedings perceived as just lead to acceptance and 
deference to the resulting judicial decisions. In consumer bankruptcy, the per-
tinent decisions are whether to grant discharge or whether to confirm a repay-
ment plan that hopefully will lead to discharge.109 Regardless of the outcome, 
every debtor’s financial life continues past the bankruptcy case’s conclusion. 
The extent to which debtors accept their cases’ outcomes may affect their mo-
tivation to make efficient use of the fresh start and to reenter the economy—
that is, to effectuate the policies underlying the consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem.110 
Second, perceptions of the consumer bankruptcy process also may affect 
how the public views the legitimacy of granting overindebted individuals the 
opportunity to obtain a discharge. This likewise may impact the ability of the 
consumer bankruptcy system to achieve its policy goals, and may affect 
whether the overindebted households that will benefit from receiving a dis-
charge of debts will be inclined to use the system. 
Given what people generally know about the legal system—learned 
through conversations with friends and family, television, books, and other 
media—it can be posited that most people think that after a household files 
bankruptcy, the debtors will sit before a judge and explain why they are asking 
to be excused from paying their debts. Given society’s overall disapproval of 
overindebtedness, people probably expect that debtors will be required to de-
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Tyler, supra note 11, at 665 (discussing the general public’s assessment of legal institu-
tions on the basis of perceptions of procedural justice). 
 108 See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and 
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 233–
34 (2001) (finding that public confidence and trust in state courts depends on people’s assessments of 
the fairness of state courts’ procedures); supra note 99 and accompanying text (outlining these four 
factors). 
 109 See supra notes 31–54 and accompanying text. 
 110 See Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 96, at 7 (discussing the perceptions of procedural 
justice and noting that “[l]ess command and control is needed, and individuals can rely more on self-
regulation in settings where authorities act in procedurally fair ways”); supra notes 20–28 and accom-
panying text. This observation aligns with the dignitary theory of procedural justice, which argues that 
fair processes are most valuable because they enforce norms about dignity and acceptable interactions 
among citizens. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 94, at 138–40 (discussing two primary theories of 
procedural justice, the instrumental approach and the dignitary approach, and noting other theories). 
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clare that they cannot pay back what they owe, that they are unable to live up 
to their financial and social obligations, and that their predicament, simply put, 
is hopeless. Again, given the vilification of overindebtedness, debtors likely 
anticipate having the chance to impugn their creditors for not working with 
them to make payments affordable, for not agreeing to refinance home loans, 
or for simply extending them too much credit. 
Most people—both consumer debtors and the general public—also prob-
ably think that creditors will be present during these hearings and will have the 
right to cross-examine debtors, similar to what people see on television shows 
involving the criminal justice system.111 People consequently may believe that 
creditors will hear debtors’ stories. Those households that file bankruptcy may 
anticipate—perhaps fear—what their creditors may ask or say in response. 
The actual bankruptcy process that consumer debtors encounter bears lit-
tle resemblance to the procedure that people likely anticipate. Recall that chap-
ter 7 and chapter 13 are distinct substantively.112 But, the commonalities be-
tween the two proceedings are the most significant to people’s perceptions of 
bankruptcy’s procedures. 
Most debtors never appear in court before the bankruptcy judge and gen-
erally have little to no voice during their bankruptcy proceedings. Besides their 
attorneys, the only judicial “officials” who debtors physically see are bank-
ruptcy trustees. Debtors typically meet with trustees once, at the 341 meeting, 
for ten minutes to half an hour, depending on the chapter and on the case’s 
complexity.113 At these meetings, most debtors are not confronted by their 
creditors, though debtors may mention their creditors in their discussions with 
trustees.114 Thus, most debtors never have the opportunity to speak to bank-
ruptcy judges or to their creditors directly nor to observe their attorneys doing 
so on their behalf.115 
This presents a problem. The 341 meeting almost certainly does not pro-
vide an adequate substitute for what people anticipate they will experience or 
what procedural justice research calls for in a legal proceeding’s process. Stat-
ed succinctly, the consumer bankruptcy system appears to be procedurally 
bankrupt. 
                                                                                                                           
 111 The Sixth Amendment grants people the right to confront their accusers in criminal proceed-
ings. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The lay public may believe that this right is universal and be shocked to 
find out it does not apply in civil and administrative proceedings. 
 112 See supra notes 31–54 and accompanying text. 
 113 See supra notes 39–43, 46 and accompanying text for a discussion of 341 hearings. The ap-
proximate timing comes from my observations of dozens of 341 hearings. 
 114 This is based upon my observations of dozens of 341 hearings. 
 115 Recall that people’s perceptions of procedural justice involve being present while attorneys 
speak with judges or other officials. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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If debtors do not feel that they have a voice or that they can trust the au-
thorities overseeing their cases—judges and trustees—then they may question 
whether these authorities sincerely considered their financial problems. For 
those debtors who do not receive a discharge or fail to complete their repay-
ment plans, not having had the chance to speak with the judge and to be heard 
by their creditors may negatively affect their ability to move forward post-
dismissal as they try to restructure their financial lives on their own. Even 
debtors who receive discharges or confirmation of their repayment plans may 
find bankruptcy’s procedures lacking and become disillusioned. Importantly, 
all debtors may discuss their experiences during their cases with others, poten-
tially disseminating information that persuades other households in need of the 
discharge not to file bankruptcy. More broadly, this information may spread a 
negative view of the consumer bankruptcy system and of the federal judiciary. 
That people could become disheartened even if they receive a discharge 
or plan confirmation also matters because the fresh start is simply that—a start. 
After the discharge and during their repayment plans, people need to continue 
to work to manage their finances and economic lives. This is not an easy 
task.116 Maintaining the fresh start is difficult, even for people who try their 
hardest.117 That only one-third of chapter 13 debtors complete their plans and 
thus receive a discharge demonstrates how challenging it can be to stay afloat 
financially after filing bankruptcy.118 
Even so, it may not be critical to consumer bankruptcy’s effectiveness for 
debtors to feel that they had an opportunity to be heard by an authority who 
they view as legitimate. What people expect from the procedures of other parts 
of the justice system may not translate to consumer bankruptcy. People may 
want a discharge of their debts and not much more. But if people expect more, 
then consumer bankruptcy’s lack of procedural justice may damage the sys-
tem’s effectiveness. In not receiving what they expect from the bankruptcy 
process, research suggests that debtors will be less likely to accept their cases’ 
outcomes and to work to make the best use of the discharge. 
Section B begins by providing an overview of research regarding how 
people assert and affirm their social standing and deal with their emotions 
through the legal system. It then applies this research to the people who file 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Sara S. Greene, Parina Patel, & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empirical Anal-
ysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2017) (giving an over-
view of statistics about chapter 13 case dismissal); Porter & Thorne, supra note 21, at 70 (finding 
from a survey of households that filed chapter 7 that within one year after discharge, one-quarter of 
the households were struggling to pay routine bills and one-third of the households’ overall financial 
situation had worsened since filing bankruptcy). 
 118 See Greene et al., supra note 117, at 1042–43 (calculating the average nationwide chapter 13 
repayment plan completion rate). 
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bankruptcy to assess how crucial consumer bankruptcy’s procedures are to the 
system’s success.119 
B. Expression Through the Consumer Bankruptcy System 
1. Social Standing 
Legal rules express social norms and serve significant social purposes 
apart from directly controlling people’s behavior.120 The actions of judges, 
government officials, and citizens acting through participation in the public 
and private legal systems also express society’s view of the accused offender 
and presumptive victim in the situations presented, similarly communicating 
social norms. These observations are based on theories about the legal system’s 
expressive functions.121 This Article’s theory of consumer bankruptcy’s proce-
dural justice is concerned with one strand of the legal system’s expressive 
function—the significance of punishment or a finding of fault of an accused 
offender to a victim’s social standing. 
This understanding of the legal system’s expressive value is most clearly 
refined in the context of criminal law. When a prosecutor takes action against 
an accused, and the accused receives a sentence at the hands of a judge or jury, 
the victim and members of society perceive that outcome as denunciation of 
the offender’s actions.122 Punishment expresses “disapproval and reprobation, 
on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose 
name’ the punishment is inflicted.”123 It thus carries the “symbolic signifi-
cance” of moral condemnation of the offender.124 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See infra notes 120–206 and accompanying text. 
 120 See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, 50 PSYCH. LEARNING 
& MOTIVATION 101, 102 (2009) (“[T]he law prescribes and proscribes morally laden behaviors, but it 
also unabashedly attempts to shape moral attitudes and beliefs.”); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. 
Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U. CAL. IRVINE L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2015) (applying this variety of 
expressive theories of law to the patent system); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–24 (1996) (“Many people support law because of the statements 
made by law, and disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of 
law.”). 
 121 For a more complete overview, see Adler, supra note 6, at 1414–27 (describing the expressive 
theories of punishment). 
 122 See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95–
118 (1970) (discussing moral condemnation through legal punishment); Jean Hampton, An Expressive 
Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 20–22 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) [here-
inafter Hampton, An Expressive Theory] (discussing how the message sent by criminal punishment is 
about the “moral relationship among human beings”); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597–98 (1996) (discussing the expressive theory of criminal punish-
ment). 
 123 FEINBERG, supra note 122, at 98. 
 124 Id.; see Kahan, supra note 122, at 593 (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suf-
fer; it is a special social convention that signifies moral condemnation.”). 
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Criminal punishment’s symbolic significance links directly to a victim’s 
social standing. A person’s view of her social standing, including where she 
stands in relation to others in her social group and to society at large, is integral 
to fulfilling her “need to belong.”125 Assessment of social standing encom-
passes two social group dimensions: “within groups” and “between groups.”126 
People view themselves as belonging to a particular social group, their “in-
group,” and compare their “ingroup” to other social “outgroups” to assess how 
their group stands “between groups” in society.127 
A person’s ingroup itself carries a positive or negative connotation, de-
termined by comparing its prestige to the prestige of relevant outgroups: posi-
tive discrepancies result in high prestige and negative discrepancies result in 
low prestige.128 Because people generally value a “positive social identity,”129 
they will strive to enhance their group’s position, or, at the very least, maintain 
their group’s social identity.130 A necessary corollary of this observation is that 
when their social identity is threatened, people will seek to assert and confirm 
their social status and their group’s relative position in society.131 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2007); see 
Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Justice, Social Identity, and Group Processes, in THE PSYCHOLO-
GY OF THE SOCIAL SELF 223, 223 (Tom R. Tyler et al. eds., 1999) (“[G]roups both define who people 
are and tell them how to evaluate what they are worth.”); Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The 
Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 497 (1995) (discussing affiliating with other people); Richard H. McAdams, 
The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355–56 (1997) (“[P]eople 
seek esteem: the good opinion or respect of others.”). 
 126 See Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 15–16 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 
1986) (providing an overview of social identity and social comparison); Bilz & Nadler, supra note 
120, at 122–23 (discussing the aspects of social standing). 
 127 See Tajfel & Turner, supra note 126, at 15 (conceptualizing a group “as a collection of indi-
viduals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional 
involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus 
about the evaluation of their group and of their membership in it”). 
 128 See id. at 16–17 (“The evaluation of one’s own group is determined with reference to specific 
other groups through social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics.”); John C. 
Turner & Rina S. Onorato, Social Identity, Personality, and the Self-Concept: A Self-Categorization 
Perspective, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SELF, supra note 125, at 11, 18 (discussing compari-
sons of ingroup and relevant outgroups). 
 129 Bilz, supra note 125; see Tajfel & Turner, supra note 126, at 16–17 (discussing how positive 
and negative discrepancies may lead to competitive acts among social groups). 
 130 See Wenzel et al., supra note 4, at 383 (“Status and power are inherently relative or competi-
tive.”). 
 131 See id. (discussing how “victims distinguish psychologically between themselves and the 
offender”). 
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In the context of crime, as argued by Jean Hampton, an offender’s actions 
may degrade and demean the victim, imperiling the victim’s social standing.132 
Even if the offender’s actions do not inflict harm or suffering on the victim, the 
victim may lose status within her ingroup because “inherent in a criminal’s 
action is the message that the victim is not worth enough for him to treat her 
better.”133 Others may share the victim’s sense of social standing loss.134 Con-
sequently, the victim will be motivated to reclaim her social standing.135 
Besides potentially morally condemning the accused, prosecution pro-
vides “a referendum on the social standing and worth of the victim,” allowing 
the victim to objectively assess her social standing through the eyes of oth-
ers.136 If a judge or jury of the victim’s peers punishes the accused, the victim 
may conclude that society believes that the message of the offender’s action 
about her value and social worth were incorrect, restoring her social standing. 
But if a judge or jury does not punish the accused, the victim may conclude 
that her community disdains her, that the accused’s actions were appropriate, 
and that she belongs to a less prestigious ingroup.137 
The same holds true for third-party observers of criminal proceedings. 
Research shows that when an accused is punished, community members’ per-
ceptions of the victim’s worth improve, but that when the accused escapes pun-
ishment, community members respect and value the victim less.138 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Hampton, An Expressive Theory, supra note 122, at 6 (distinguishing degradation from 
feeling demeaned); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribu-
tion, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1666 (1992) (noting that some actions are “an affront to the victim’s 
value or dignity”). 
 133 Hampton, An Expressive Theory, supra note 122, at 12. 
 134 See Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of Punish-
ment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 1233–37 (2004) (discussing how robbery victims report that feel-
ings of being violated are more detrimental to them than the actual material loss and describing the 
effects of victimization on third parties). 
 135 See Bilz, supra note 125, at 1086–87 (“[People] aspire to be well-regarded members of the 
groups to which they do belong, and they value their group having high standing compared to other 
groups.”). 
 136 See id. at 1088–89 (“Social status is, by definition, social.”). 
 137 See id. at 1088 (discussing punishment as it relates to social standing); Kahan, supra note 122, 
at 598 (providing similar discussion). 
 138 See Carloyn L. Hafer, Why We Reject Innocent Victims, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERY-
DAY LIFE 109, 109, 113–14 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2011) (finding that if an accused is 
not punished, third parties tend to disassociate themselves from the victim); Kenworthey Bilz, Testing 
the Expressive Theory of Punishment, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 358, 361–62, 385–86 (2016) 
[hereinafter Bilz, Testing] (discussing this empirical evidence and demonstrating that, in the eyes of 
others, criminal punishment of an accused increases the victim’s social standing, while failure to pun-
ish decreases the victim’s social standing); Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by 
Criminal Proceedings, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 313, 313–14 (2002) (finding that victims who believe that 
the criminal justice system failed them feel rejected by their community and society). 
2322 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2297 
Similarly, when a private citizen seeks to hold an accused offender ac-
countable through a legal proceeding, and a judge or jury does so, this sends a 
message about what society thinks of the offender’s actions, the offender, and 
the victim. Tort verdicts or even a sincere apology from a perpetrator to the 
victim conveys information about the wrongfulness of the accused’s behavior, 
thereby communicating to the victim that she is a valued member of society.139 
As with the theory of the expressive function of criminal law, empirical re-
search shows that plaintiffs’ goals in civil litigation transcend monetary con-
cerns and include aims that are expressive and communicative, such as 
acknowledgement of harm and admissions of fault.140 
2. Emotions 
Part of seeking confirmation of social standing is dealing with the emo-
tions that arise from the actions and circumstances that bring people to the ju-
dicial system. Indeed, research increasingly explores emotions’ connection 
with the legal system.141 Emotions are described as “engagements with the 
world.”142 People’s emotions both affect how they act and manifest as cogni-
tive and physiological states.143 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 101, at 19 (noting that public judgment can “communi-
cate to an injured party that he is a respected member of the community” and that an apology can 
provide accountability from the accused); Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles, 11 LAW & 
PHIL. 297, 316–17 (1992) (“[T]he tort system, when it works well, constitutes a conventional device 
by which an injurer may be compelled to express regret to his victim.”); Cass R. Sunstein et al., As-
sessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 
2086 (1998) (connecting punitive damages “with their historical origins in affronts to the honor of the 
victims”). 
 140 See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS 93 
(1995) (finding that litigants turn to the judicial system for validation that they have received unjust 
treatment); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ 
Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 706–07 (2007) (recounting findings from interviews with 
parties and attorneys involved in sixty-four medical malpractice cases); Wenzel et al., supra note 4, at 
377 (“Victims seem to place less importance on material restoration than ‘emotional restoration.’”). 
 141 For foundational works in this field, see generally SUSAN A. BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF LAW 
(1999) (discussing the role emotions play within the justice system); Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. 
Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2012) (discussing the field of 
law and emotion); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 
1485 (2011) (proposing a model for management of judicial emotions); Terry A. Maroney, Law and 
Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006) (propos-
ing six interrelated subfields within law and emotion). 
 142 Robert C. Solomon, Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings: Emotions as Engagements with the 
World, in THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS ON EMOTIONS 76, 76 (Robert 
C. Solomon ed., 2004). See generally Dacher Keltner & Jennifer S. Lerner, Emotion, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 317 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 2010) (discussing how emotions are 
social). 
 143 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 297 (1996) (“Emotions motivate behavior.”); Emily Kidd White, Till Human 
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“Psychologists generally identify eight basic emotions: anger, anticipa-
tion, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, and trust.”144 Other literature identi-
fies several other major emotions, including guilt and shame. Of these emo-
tions, anger, guilt, shame, and disgust stand out as relevant to consumer debt-
ors’ decisions to use the bankruptcy system.145 This Article focuses on these 
emotions in part based on my prior study of consumers’ complaints about fi-
nancial product and service providers filed through the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB)’s complaint mechanism.146 With consumers’ per-
mission, the CFPB publishes the narratives that consumers write in connection 
with their complaints.147 The emotions that people use to describe their debt 
problems during a time when they could file bankruptcy are particularly rele-
vant to understanding the feelings that people may bring with them into the 
bankruptcy system. Of note, these narratives strongly display consumers’ anger 
and frustration.148 
Anger is the emotion most often associated with criminal and civil justice. 
It arises when a person feels insulted or hurt in a significant way.149 Feeling 
angry hinges on presuppositions about proper behavior and what constitutes 
respect—that is, social norms.150 If people are not treated according to ex-
pected norms, they will question their social status.151 Anger presses people to 
                                                                                                                           
Voices Wake Us: The Role of Emotions in the Adjudication of Dignity Claims, 3 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 
201, 204 (2014) (discussing the affective and cognitive states of emotions). 
 144 See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling Stories and Consumer Protection, 
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 189 (2017) [hereinafter Foohey, Calling on] (discussing basic and 
major emotions). 
 145 See id.; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 143, at 276 (listing major emotions). 
 146 See generally Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144 (discussing how understanding emotions 
can improve the CFPB). 
 147 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER COMPLAINT DATABASE, https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-complaints/ [https://perma.cc/P4EB-4TWD] (publish-
ing the narratives of certain consumers). 
 148 Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144, at 195. I also focused on sadness and fear when analyzing 
the narratives. Id. at 189–91. 
 149 See RICHARD S. LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 217–34 (1991) (discussing anger); 
Richard S. Lazarus, Progress on a Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory of Emotion, 46 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 819, 828 (1991) (noting that insult is the primary instigator of anger); Dale T. Miller, 
Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527, 533 (2001) (discussing 
research showing that disrespect leads to anger and aggression). 
 150 People expect to be treated with more respect by ingroup members than outgroup members, 
and being treated with disrespect by ingroup versus outgroup members provokes different responses. 
Miller, supra note 149, at 539 (noting that outgroup offenses provoke a “How dare they?” response 
and ingroup offenses provoke a “How could they?” response). 
 151 See id. at 533 (linking disrespect and “social imbalance”). 
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defend their status and reinforce what they believe is appropriate behavior, re-
storing their self-esteem and achieving closure.152 
For example, in the context of crime, an injustice perpetrated against a 
victim triggers anger. Drawing from this anger, the victim retaliates to restore 
self-esteem and educate the offender about proper social relations.153 Punish-
ment of the offender provides for the censure that corrects “the moral-symbolic 
meaning of the offense.”154 
Guilt and shame, two distinct but related “self-conscious” emotions, also 
are intertwined with people’s sense of self and social standing.155 Self-
conscious emotions require individuals to have a “sense of self as well as a set 
of standards” by which they assess their own behavior as successful or 
failed.156 A person feels guilt when she evaluates her action or behavior as fail-
ing and focuses on what about her specific behavior transgressed an important 
social norm.157 With shame, a person negatively evaluates herself as a whole as 
failing.158 Guilt thus focuses on the action, whereas shame focuses on the per-
son.159 Although the same situation can elicit guilt and shame, shame is a more 
social emotion, is regulated through community standards, and is linked with a 
person’s social image and feelings of social devaluation.160 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 143, at 347–48 (discussing anger, social norms, and sta-
tus); Miller, supra note 149, at 534, 540–41 (linking anger with self-esteem and perceptions of injus-
tice); Arne Roets & Alain Van Hiel, An Integrative Process Approach of Judgment and Decision 
Making: The Impact of Arousal, Affect, Motivation, and Cognitive Ability, 61 PSYCHOL. REC. 497, 
499–500 (2011) (discussing closure as a motivator in decision making). 
 153 See Miller, supra note 149, at 540–42 (discussing the goals of retaliation); Wenzel et al., supra 
note 4, at 380 (“[V]ictims seek revenge to restore their honor and their self-image.”). 
 154 Wenzel et al., supra note 4, at 379. 
 155 Michael Lewis, Self-Conscious Emotions, 83 AM. SCIENTIST 68, 68 (1995). 
 156 Id.; see Jessica L. Tracy & Richard W. Robins, Putting the Self into Self-Conscious Emotions: 
A Theoretical Model, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 103, 105 (2004) (noting that people experience self-
conscious emotions when they are aware they have succeeded or failed to live up to an ideal). 
 157 See Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna, Differentiating Shame from Guilt, 27 CONSCIOUS-
NESS & COGNITION 725, 727 (2008) (“[G]uilt is tied to some specific behavior.”). 
 158 See id. (defining shame). 
 159 See Foohey, Calling on, supra note 144, at 191 (differentiating shame and guilt); Raffaele 
Rodogno, Shame, Guilt, and Punishment, 28 LAW & PHIL. 429, 432–33 (2009) (discussing the differ-
ence). 
 160 See LAZARUS, supra note 149, at 240–47 (distinguishing guilt and shame); Paul Gilbert, Evo-
lution, Social Roles, and the Differences in Shame and Guilt, 70 SOC. RES. 1205, 1208 (2003) 
(“Shame relates to the competitive dynamics of life, linked to social standing and personal reputa-
tions.”); Margaret E. Kemeny et al., Shame as the Emotional Response to Threat to the Social Self: 
Implications for Behavior, Physiology, and Health, 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 153, 154 (2004) (discuss-
ing studies regarding the link between shame and social status); Teroni & Deonna, supra note 157, at 
729 (linking shame and community standards). 
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The behavioral consequences of guilt and shame also differ. Guilt drives 
people to try to repair the wrongs associated with it.161 Shame encourages peo-
ple to hide so as to preserve their social standing.162 Nonetheless, people may 
act in the face of shame with “reparative and conciliatory behavior” to avoid 
an unwanted lower social status or to escape stigmatization.163 Stigma can 
strongly influence feelings of shame, particularly depending on which cultural 
values are marked as worthy of stigmatizing others for their nonconformity.164 
The shame associated with stigmatization may provoke anger, which may 
prompt people to act to eliminate present and future feelings of shame.165 
Finally, disgust intersects with anger, guilt, and shame. Disgust arises 
when people confront something revolting,166 and creates a desire to change or 
withdraw from a situation or person.167 Like guilt and shame, disgust is a 
“moral” emotion.168 People may find others (or themselves) disgusting if they 
violate a social or moral code.169 Disgust can be felt as a self-condemning 
emotion whereby people want to purge themselves of what they find reviling 
to “reestablish dignity.”170 
Disgust also links with shame’s response to others’ disapproval, a disap-
proval possibly grounded in disgust for what they have done, such as not pay 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Gilbert, supra note 160, at 1205–06 (describing guilt as “evolv[ing] from a care-giving 
and ‘avoiding doing harm to others’ system”); Tracy & Robins, supra note 156, at 103 (discussing 
research regarding the behavioral outcomes of guilt and shame). 
 162 See LAZARUS, supra note 149, at 243–44 (distinguishing the “action tendencies” of guilt and 
shame and noting that “shame makes us want to hide”). 
 163 See Teroni & Deonna, supra note 157, at 735 (discussing the differences between shame and 
guilt). See generally Debra Patterson & Rebecca Campbell, Why Rape Survivors Participate in the 
Criminal Justice System, 28 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 191 (2010) (discussing what makes some rape 
survivors withdraw from criminal investigations versus what makes other survivors continue to partic-
ipate after reporting their assaults). 
 164 See Gilbert, supra note 160, at 1215–19 (discussing how shame and stigma are linked with 
cultural values). See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (linking stigma, social identity, personal identity, and group alignment). 
 165 See Gilbert, supra note 160, at 1225 (“Shaming people can lead to various unhelpful defensive 
emotions.”); James Gilligan, Shame, Guilt, and Violence, 70 SOC. RES. 1149, 1149–52, 1159–60 
(2003) (noting that researchers often provoke anger in experiments by insulting—that is, shaming, 
people). 
 166 See LAZARUS, supra note 149, at 259–62 (discussing disgust). 
 167 See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 1–2 (1997) (overviewing disgust); 
Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 799, 808–09 (2015) 
(noting that disgust shapes decision making through goal activation). 
 168 See Jonathan Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852, 853 
(R.J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003) (“Moral emotions are the emotions that respond to moral violations 
or that motivate moral behavior.”); MILLER, supra note 167, at 1–2 (discussing how disgust “is a 
moral and social sentiment”). 
 169 Haidt, supra note 168, at 855–61 (categorizing emotions). 
 170 Id. at 857–58; see MILLER, supra note 167, at 34–35 (associating disgust with self-loathing). 
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their debts, which itself creates social inequality.171 People often react to their 
perceived social inequality by trying to distance themselves from the traits 
within themselves that caused their disgust.172 
Overall, across anger, guilt, shame, and disgust, one of people’s main re-
sponses is to try to distance themselves from the emotion. Distancing them-
selves from these feelings should increase people’s perceptions of their relative 
social standing. As such, as with other legal proceedings, overindebted indi-
viduals may look to the bankruptcy process to help them deal with these emo-
tions and assert their social standing. 
3. Debts’ Diminished Social Standing and Heightened Emotions 
For the one million people who file bankruptcy every year,173 their finan-
cial situations undoubtedly prompt them to consider using bankruptcy to gain a 
fresh start. Aside from how bankruptcy discharge’s benefits accrue to the full-
est extent possible, bankruptcy’s procedures should align with how people ac-
tually use the system. People’s mindset when they file bankruptcy shapes what 
they seek from their cases, including as expressive and emotional matters. Un-
derstanding this mindset is central to evaluating the effects of consumer bank-
ruptcy’s seeming lack of procedural justice. 
Research about who files bankruptcy provides clues as to people’s out-
look on their situations as they enter the bankruptcy system.174 Most signifi-
cantly, consumer debtors report struggling for years to pay their debts prior to 
filing.175 Despite having tried to pay their debts by forgoing necessities and 
employing a wide range of coping mechanisms, they have landed in a state of 
stressful overindebtedness marred by calls from creditors and debt collec-
tors.176 
People facing ostensibly insurmountable debts may find themselves dis-
gusted by their financial situations. They may feel guilty and ashamed about 
their social offense of being unable to pay their debts. People also may be an-
gry at the creditors who seemingly allowed them to get into such dire financial 
                                                                                                                           
 171 See MILLER, supra note 167, at 34–35 (noting that “[d]isgust works first and if it fails shame 
will be the consequence” and linking “sociomoral” disgust and social inequality); June Price Tangney 
et al., Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 345, 353 (2007) (linking shame 
and feeling disgust “for a bad, defective self”). 
 172 See MILLER, supra note 167, at 34 (“In disgust we wish to have the offensive thing disappear 
by the removal of either ourselves or it; in shame we simply want to disappear.”); Lerner et al., supra 
note 167, at 809 (noting that studies show that disgust makes people more likely to choose to switch to 
something unknown rather than keep something disgusting). 
 173 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 174 See generally supra notes 56–89 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 176 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
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situations, and then dunned them with calls to collect debts that they increas-
ingly had little hope of being able to pay. 
Because of debtors’ financial situations, during the months leading up to 
their bankruptcy filings, most unsecured creditors cannot collect on delinquent 
debts unless the debtors agree to pay or the creditors go to court to receive 
judgments that allow them to attach debtors’ property, such as orders to garnish 
debtors’ bank accounts or wages.177 Data from the CBP show that creditors file 
such actions to collect on debts, secured and unsecured.178 These actions like-
wise may incite anger, particularly if people are unable to pay their expenses 
because of the garnishment.179 
Debt collection, both in and out of court, may also add to people’s guilt. 
Every call is an instance in which debtors are unable to live up to their obliga-
tions. Regardless of how boorishly debt collectors treat them, people generally 
want to pay.180 As one debt collector observed: 
It is a big misconception that people don’t want to pay. When the 
debtors do the screaming, and the ducking out, and the complaining, 
it’s just them lashing out because they can’t pay . . . . If you called 
people up and they had ten grand in the bank, they would pay in-
stantly.181 
Being unable to pay is an act of failure, an act that transgresses the im-
portant social norm of paying back one’s debts. Debtors’ lashing out and com-
plaining, as noted by this debt collector, likely arises from people’s guilt and 
disgust when faced with the inability to pay debts. Similarly, garnishment or-
ders are statements issued by judicial authorities that households are unable to 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnish-
ments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 622–24 (2006) (overviewing garnishment and describing a garnish-
ment order as “forcing the third party to pay a portion of these assets to the creditor instead of the 
debtor”); Mann & Porter, supra note 49, at 309–10 (discussing garnishment). 
 178 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 179 See John Infranca, Safer Than the Mattress? Protecting Social Security Benefits from Bank 
Freezes and Garnishments, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2009) (noting that a “brief interrup-
tion” in access to social security benefits via garnishment can make “it difficult, if not impossible, for 
a beneficiary to purchase food, pay rent, and provide for basic medical needs”). 
 180 See Sousa, supra note 61, at 464–68 (quoting from interviews with consumer debtors about 
wanting to pay back their debts); Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Per-
sonal Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77, 83 (2006) (discussing how people attempt to pay back their 
debts); Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Manage-
ment of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 971–72 (2010) (noting that people contin-
ue to pay their mortgages “even when they are hundreds of thousands of dollars underwater and have 
no reasonable prospect of recouping their losses”). 
 181 See JAKE HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE UNDERWORLD 
95–96 (2014) (quoting a debt collector and further noting that most collectors heeded this observation 
and strove to empathize and thereby “marry the debtor”). 
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live up to their obligations. People may view these orders as public affirma-
tions of their failure, creating feelings of guilt, shame, and anger. 
People also may become disillusioned with their creditors and the con-
sumer credit industry more generally. The 2008 financial crisis brought calls 
for reforms aimed at curbing deceitful behavior by banks and other financial 
institutions.182 Popular narratives about who is to blame for individuals’ finan-
cial failures also shifted. Rather than attribute overindebtedness solely to con-
sumers’ actions and character flaws, financial institutions increasingly bore 
negative labels, such as peddlers of “financial weapons of mass destruction,” 
as characterized by Warren Buffet.183 
Such feelings about the economic system’s role in overindebtedness are 
not unique to the 2008 financial crisis. History has often pitted households that 
spend for personal and family purposes against their creditors.184 These con-
flicts are described as part of “class formation, with an indebted lower class 
and a more powerful creditor higher class.”185 Perceptions about this lower-
class status may influence how people think about using the legal system’s 
substantive law or the system’s procedures.186 
Research further shows that indebtedness, particularly debts so large that 
they impact how people live their everyday lives, brings a perceived lower-
class status. That is, people experience overindebtedness as a distinct “lower” 
and stigmatized social class.187 Importantly, overindebtedness plunges some 
individuals and families into this lower social class. Although overindebted-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Charles Eisenstein, “Don’t Owe. Won’t Pay.” Everything You’ve Been Told About Debt Is 
Wrong, YES! MAG. (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/the-debt-issue/don-t-owe-
won-t-pay-charles-eisenstein-debt-20150820 [https://perma.cc/YD7F-7GUC] (discussing the crisis). 
 183 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003); see CATHY O’NEIL, WEAP-
ONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 3–8 (2016) (referring to many financial products as “weapons of math 
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 184 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Debt and the Simulation of Social Class, in A DEBTOR WORLD: IN-
TERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT, supra note 24, at 36, 48 (noting the “long history” of 
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 185 Sullivan, supra note 184, at 48. 
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sumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 401 
(1994) (noting that bankruptcy may serve as a “vehicle for delivering the elusive goal of consumer 
justice” when other consumer protection laws fall short). 
 187 See Stephen E.G. Lea et al., The Psychology of Debt in Poor Households in Britain, in A 
DEBTOR WORLD: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON DEBT, supra note 24, at 151, 152 (discuss-
ing data); Sullivan, supra note 184, at 48 (highlighting the “loss of social status, sometimes in severe 
ways” that is historically associated with debt). 
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ness transcends socio-economic class,188 people who for much of their lives 
identified as middle-class make up the vast majority of the consumers who 
ultimately file bankruptcy.189 
To appreciate the perceived severity of this loss of social status, consider 
the predominant factors that lead the people who file bankruptcy to become 
overindebted: job loss, divorce, and health problems.190 In all likelihood, most 
people do not consider any of these causes of their overindebtedness to be 
within their control. No one wants to get sick.191 Despite nationwide divorce 
rates, (presumably almost) no one enters into a marriage planning to di-
vorce.192 And although people’s behavior and skills can lead to job loss, shifts 
in the economy and declining average duration of employment with a particu-
lar employer have become the chief drivers of job loss.193 
Overindebtedness further hampers these individuals’ ability to lift them-
selves back into the “higher” middle socio-economic class to which they for-
merly belonged.194 Given this, those who eventually file bankruptcy may feel 
trapped in the stigmatized and shameful state of overindebtedness. Although 
this stigma and shame may make some people withdraw from society as they 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Lupica, supra note 22, at 587 (“The tension between the desire and resistance to consume 
is felt by consumers at all levels of the class spectrum.”). 
 189 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 190 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 191 This statement excludes people suffering from Münchausen syndrome, which itself is a dis-
ease. See Richard Gunderman, When People Seem to Want to Be Sick, THE ATLANTIC (June 11, 
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 193 See Jacob S. Hacker, The Middle Class at Risk, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MID-
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recession and discussing the growth of “income instability” among American households); Braucher, 
supra note 184, at 332 (noting that fewer unions and more competitive labor markets have increased 
job insecurity). 
 194 See Lupica, supra note 22, at 563 (“[O]verindebtedness . . . thwarts class mobility.”); Kathe-
rine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 979, 1006 (2012) [hereinafter Porter, The 
Damage] (“Other important endowments that may be altered as a result of overindebtedness are edu-
cation, job training, and health.”); Anuj K. Shah et al., Some Consequences of Having Too Little, 338 
SCI. 682, 684–85 (2012) (discussing how not having enough money to pay for basic expenses can lead 
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(2015) (noting how lack of access to financial services “makes it even more difficult for [the poor] to 
escape poverty”). 
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deal with a loss of self-esteem,195 overindebtedness caused by events and cir-
cumstances beyond one’s control may not necessarily prompt feelings of 
shame to the point of lowering one’s self-esteem. 
Research shows that when people blame themselves for the negative out-
comes in their lives, they are likely to experience low self-esteem, but when 
they attribute their failures to others and outside forces, such as prejudice, they 
can protect their self-esteem.196 Given this, people who turn to bankruptcy may 
react to their financial situations in a way that encourages them to take stock of 
what is happening around them.197 In considering their circumstances, they 
also may tend toward disgust, including reviling at their overindebtedness, and 
experiencing it as something from which they want to distance themselves. 
When combined with their stewing anger at creditors, instead of retreat-
ing into their shame, some middle-class debtors may lash out toward their 
creditors, resolving to refute “illegitimate” debts.198 Indeed, the belief that 
some debts are less legitimate than others dovetails with perceptions that debt 
is ubiquitous to the point of being systemic and inescapable. People thus may 
view their own crushing debts as even more out of their control, again pushing 
them toward feelings of anger and disgust. People will likely direct this disgust 
toward their creditors and the economic system. This disgust thus should fur-
ther urge people to distance themselves from their creditors. 
In sum, consumer debtors do not simply enter bankruptcy for the dis-
charge; rather, their pre-bankruptcy experiences set them up to be paradigms 
for the expressive value theory of people’s use of the legal system. The people 
who file bankruptcy are positioned to want the legal process to assist them in 
“clearing the air” about their financial lives in addition to clearing their debts. 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See, e.g., Jennifer Crocker & Hart Blanton, Social Inequality and Self-Esteem: The Moderat-
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4. What People Want from Consumer Bankruptcy’s Procedures 
With this background, now consider what social and emotional benefits 
people may anticipate from the bankruptcy process. Debtors should be particu-
larly interested in what bankruptcy’s procedures may allow them to convey to 
their communities and what the procedures’ outcomes communicate about 
their social standing. Through the bankruptcy process, they may desire to as-
sert and assess their social status, confirm their “ingroup,” and reinforce their 
position in society, including through their discussions with the bankruptcy 
judge and their creditors.199 
To assert what they believe is their true social standing, debtors may want 
to tell their stories and explain the origin and progression of their financial sit-
uations.200 Doing so will allow them to distance themselves from the disgust 
they feel, to vent anger, and to work through lingering shame from the stigma 
of overindebtedness.201 Publicly telling their stories also may allow people to 
feel that they are taking control of their financial futures.202 
Consumer debtors’ bankruptcy case outcomes likewise should be im-
portant to them because of what the outcomes communicate about social stand-
ing. To put bankruptcy’s outcomes in the context of the criminal and civil jus-
tice systems, to a debtor, the discharge or plan confirmation order is akin to 
punishment of the accused criminal or a verdict for the plaintiff in a civil ac-
tion.203 The order acknowledges that the debtor merits forgiveness and relief 
from the stress and stigma of crushing debts.204 It also represents an opportuni-
ty to reenter the economy and to have enough funds and mental energy to par-
ticipate in social life, as debtors did before encountering the unanticipated 
events that led to unmanageable debts. Further, those debtors who are frustrat-
                                                                                                                           
 199 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
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note 24 and accompanying text. 
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ed with creditors’ and debt collectors’ actions or the credit industry in general 
may see the discharge or plan confirmation order as a condemnation of those 
actions. 
Stated in the terms of research about social status and groups,205 a con-
sumer debtor may consider the bankruptcy court’s order a public statement that 
she does not belong in the “lower” social group marred by debt. Instead, her 
correct “ingroup” is the more prestigious middle class to which she previously 
belonged. Likewise, as with criminal and civil proceedings, if the bankruptcy 
judge denies the debtor a discharge or if the debtor fails to complete the chap-
ter 13 plan, the debtor may decide that her true place within society is in the 
less prestigious social class of the chronically indebted.206 
In short, separate from any financial benefits, people likely anticipate that 
the bankruptcy process and its outcome will serve as a referendum on their 
social standing. Thus, there is good reason to think that whether people who 
use the bankruptcy system will heed and gain the most benefit from their re-
payment plans and discharges depends in part on their ability to have a voice 
during their cases. Stated differently, the lessons of research about procedural 
justice and the legal system’s expressive value should apply just as forcefully 
to consumer bankruptcy as to other parts of the justice system. 
C. What We Know About Bankruptcy’s Procedural Justice 
There exists almost no empirical research directly into the social and 
emotional impetuses that inform this Article’s theory of the importance of 
bankruptcy’s procedural justice. Most of the relevant research comes from the 
CBP. Because the CBP focuses on who files bankruptcy and why people file at 
a more macro level, its data are useful for developing the theory, but not for 
confirming the theory’s validity. 
Nonetheless, there is some relevant research from business bankruptcy, 
the results of which support this Article’s theory. As part of my project study-
ing the chapter 11 cases filed by religious nonprofits—mainly Christian 
churches—I interviewed forty-five leaders who put their churches and reli-
                                                                                                                           
 205 See supra notes 120–140 and accompanying text. 
 206 Some people file bankruptcy multiple times. See Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: 
Congressional Crackdown on Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 245–
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gious schools into chapter 11 proceedings between 2006 and 2013.207 During 
these interviews, in part to assess what they expected from the bankruptcy pro-
cess, I asked the leaders if anything about their bankruptcy cases surprised or 
stood out to them.208 
Pastors and other interviewees are business leaders, not consumer debt-
ors. Even so, these interviewees’ reactions to their organizations’ bankruptcy 
cases offer a useful vantage point to assess this Article’s theory because reli-
gious non-profits’ bankruptcy filings show similarities to consumer bankruptcy 
filings. Most notably, the timing of the filings tracks that of individuals, not 
businesses.209 My interviews also revealed that pastors and other leaders think 
about the decisions to place their organizations in bankruptcy in ways very 
similar to how consumer debtors decide to file bankruptcy.210 
When asked if anything about the bankruptcy case surprised or stood out 
to them, leaders spoke most often of their determination to use bankruptcy to 
get back on solid financial ground in the face of creditors’ relentless and unfair 
demands. For example, one leader believed that bankruptcy “would give us 
clout, get us in position to survive, recover, all of that . . . [and n]ow we’re pro-
tected by the legal system so that people can’t take advantage of us.”211 
Another leader stated: “[W]e had a sense of hope and relief [upon filing] 
because we felt we had a shot . . . . At least we weren’t going to just roll over 
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 208 To preserve anonymity, I identify each interviewee based on a randomly assigned interview 
ID number. Interview scripts and transcriptions are on file with the author. 
 209 Foohey, When Faith Falls Short, supra note 207, at 1338–39. 
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between the demographics of churches and similar congregations nationwide that file bankruptcy 
relates to inequalities in financial institutions’ lending practices to churches. See generally id. (dis-
cussing lender discrimination with respect to black churches). 
 211 Telephone Interview with Leader 159, at 4 (May 7, 2015) (original on file with author). 
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and play dead. We were ready to fight.”212 That pastor also discussed how the 
church’s creditor had foreclosed on the church’s building, promoting a battle in 
state court. The pastor had hoped that the state court would treat them fairly, 
but did not believe this occurred. Moving to bankruptcy court, “federal court,” 
as the pastor emphasized, would bring “justice” and “treat [the church] right,” 
which included “our day in court.”213 When the judge ordered the pastor to 
mediate with the church’s creditor instead of hearing from church members in 
court, the pastor perceived that to mean that the judge was denying the church 
a voice in the proceeding: “We never get to tell our story . . . . What we wanted 
was to come in there and have our day in court.”214 The mediation resulted in a 
plan that allowed the church to keep its building. Yet the church’s pastor still 
believed that justice was not served, demonstrating the primacy of debtors’ 
perceptions about the procedural fairness over substantive outcomes. 
Other leaders also spoke of longing to take part in the proceedings, even 
if that merely meant being present in the courtroom: “I wanted to be there [in 
court] every time. But I was advised that our presence wasn’t needed. I felt that 
I would love to have been there to see the judge.”215 Part of this leader’s desire 
to be in court was “[t]o look in the face of our—not accusers—but our assas-
sins, because I look at [creditors], I have no hate, I have no disdain, I feel sorry 
for them.”216 Another leader echoed this sentiment: “We really wanted to have 
our day in court so that [the alleged wrongdoing on behalf of a bank employee] 
could come out.”217 
In contrast, those leaders who had more positive experiences appeared be-
fore judges or at least attended hearings. One leader noted that “[the judge] 
listened to all the information and I really liked him.”218 Further, as found in 
other legal contexts, a favorable outcome was not necessary to leaders’ percep-
tions that the bankruptcy process was fair. As one leader stated: “[The judge] 
was fair and just. There were things that wouldn’t work. I mean, we didn’t win 
every battle. We lost some of it. But that’s only because that’s the way it works 
in the court of law.”219 
Overall, leaders’ comments evidence how some debtors experience the 
bankruptcy process. Leaders looked for and expected proceedings to give them 
a voice and help them resolve their organizations’ financial problems in a neu-
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2019] Procedural Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy 2335 
tral forum, even if the ultimate outcome was not what they had hoped for at the 
outset. 
These interviews support this Article’s theory that consumer debtors look 
to bankruptcy for more than merely a discharge. They provide even more rea-
son to theorize that if people have a voice during their bankruptcy cases, they 
will be more likely both to experience the proceedings as fair220 and to view 
the outcomes as legitimate and as definitive statements on their social stand-
ing.221 If so, they should be more likely to make the best use of the discharge 
and to speak well of the bankruptcy system. If not, they may remain angry, 
disgusted, guilty, and ashamed,222 and more so than if they had the opportunity 
to speak with the judge and their creditors. And this may hamper the bankrupt-
cy system’s effectiveness,223 negatively impacting how people re-enter the 
credit economy, which, in turn, could affect how the credit economy functions. 
With these harmful outcomes in mind, the next Part proposes two “new deals” 
for debtors that alter consumer bankruptcy’s procedures with the goal of in-
creasing its procedural justice.224 
III. A NEW DEAL FOR DEBTORS: REFORMING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY  
TO PROVIDE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
This Article’s theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice has 
normative implications for the system and advances our understanding of how 
consumer bankruptcy works in action, on the ground.225 That scholars previ-
ously have not linked procedural justice and expressive theories of law with 
consumer bankruptcy likely relates to bankruptcy’s historical roots in criminal 
law, the unique procedural posture of debtors simultaneously initiating cases 
while asking for forgiveness, and the primacy of debates about bankruptcy’s 
stigma to recent discussions about changing consumer bankruptcy laws.226 In 
particular, that debates have focused on bankruptcy’s stigma likely led scholars 
to overlook the importance of research regarding how people can experience 
their overindebtedness as a threat to their social status. This research, in large 
part, animates the connection among procedural justice, expression through 
participation in the legal system, and bankruptcy. 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See supra notes 94–108 and accompanying text. 
 221 See supra notes 120–140 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra notes 141–172 and accompanying text. 
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2336 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2297 
Considering this research together also provides an insight into one long-
standing question about who uses the consumer bankruptcy system. Filing 
bankruptcy is largely a middle-class phenomenon.227 Although middle-class 
households are more likely to have asset and debt profiles that make bankrupt-
cy a useful financial option,228 their finances alone cannot fully explain why 
middle-class households are overrepresented among consumer debtors.229 That 
people expect the bankruptcy process to serve as a referendum on their social 
status may especially encourage middle-class households to file, skewing the 
people who file to those with middle-class backgrounds. 
Turning to the theory’s normative implications, the foremost lesson from 
the above analysis is that to enhance perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s 
procedural justice, debtors must have a more robust opportunity to interact 
with decisionmakers. This Part proposes two ways to alter consumer bankrupt-
cy to provide debtors with the chance to feel heard.230 The proposal detailed in 
Section A is modest, whereas Section B’s proposal re-envisions the system 
more radically. In addition to providing debtors with more of a voice, both 
proposals address other long-standing issues with the consumer bankruptcy 
system that have hampered its ability to deliver the fresh start and help debtors 
get back on their feet.231 
A. New Deal #1: Replacing the 341 Meeting with a Court Appearance 
The first proposal for altering consumer bankruptcy’s procedures assumes 
a goal of minimally changing current bankruptcy laws and processes while still 
enhancing people’s perceptions of the system’s procedural justice. From a leg-
                                                                                                                           
 227 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 228 The ability to pay attorney’s and filing fees also likely factors into who ultimately files bank-
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islative standpoint, this goal should make sense. A few small changes are easi-
er to enact. 
A straightforward “new deal for debtors” that promises to give consumers 
more of the voice they likely crave is to substitute the 341 meeting for a court 
appearance during which the bankruptcy judge questions the debtor. The ap-
pearance can happen in person, telephonically, via video conference, or 
through an online interface.232 This proposal requires only a few changes to 
consumer bankruptcy’s procedures and to the Bankruptcy Code.233 As a bonus, 
it will address current issues with bankruptcy trustees’ payment and attorney’s 
fees. 
The court appearance will enable debtors to tell the story of their financial 
troubles and to explain why they need a repayment plan or bankruptcy’s dis-
charge to the ultimate judicial decisionmakers—bankruptcy judges. Judges, in 
turn, can question debtors about their petitions, schedules, and other filings, 
similar to what bankruptcy trustees presently do during 341 meetings. As an 
added benefit, this procedure will allow judges to adjust their in-court and 
written comments dynamically to account for what they are hearing and see-
ing. Consequently, debtors may perceive judges’ responses to them as richer, 
bolstering their perceptions of bankruptcy’s procedural justice. 
In addition, this procedure will replicate much of what currently happens 
at 341 meetings, eliminating the need for these meetings, while also allowing 
judges to assume some of trustees’ duties, particularly those of chapter 7 trus-
tees. At present, trustees’ examinations of debtors during 341 meetings are cru-
cial to the bankruptcy system’s functioning and integrity.234 Often through no 
fault of debtors, petitions, schedules, and other filings contain mistakes. 341 
meetings allow trustees to identify errors and omissions.235 Requiring judges to 
question debtors will permit them to identify mistakes and omissions material 
                                                                                                                           
 232 See generally AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESO-
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 235 Based on my observations of 341 meetings, trustees tell debtors and their counsel in a minority 
of cases to amend their schedules to account for small errors or omissions. 
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to debtors’ cases. As with 341 meetings now, in most cases, if the judge or an-
other party, such as a creditor, finds necessary corrections or amendments, the 
debtor’s attorney can file revisions, to be reviewed by the judge. 
Bankruptcy trustees still should have the opportunity to talk with debtors, 
which can be achieved by allowing trustees to cross-examine debtors when 
they appear. In allocating some of trustees’ current duties to judges, however, 
trustees’ role necessarily will shift. Recall also that chapter 7 and chapter 13 
trustees usually are private attorneys appointed by United States Trustees 
(USTs), and that USTs’ responsibility is to monitor the efficiency and integrity 
of the bankruptcy system.236 To fulfill that duty, USTs may choose to review 
any bankruptcy case, file motions, appear in court, and cross-examine debt-
ors.237 That USTs already play a role in policing the consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem means that their obligations also can shift in light of a new procedure in 
which judges have a more outwardly prominent role. 
These shifts should result in a net benefit to the consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem’s functioning, particularly in chapter 7 cases, in which compensation cur-
rently poses challenges for the private attorneys retained as trustees. At pre-
sent, chapter 7 trustees are compensated in two ways. They receive $60 from 
the debtors’ filing fee,238 and they receive a sliding-scale commission based on 
the non-exempt assets they identify and sell on behalf of the debtor’s credi-
tors.239 Because more than 90% of consumer chapter 7 cases are no asset,240 
trustees usually make $60 per filing. If the bankruptcy judge waives the filing 
fee, the trustee makes nothing.241 As a result, trustees have an incentive to ag-
gressively look for non-exempt assets, even though they will make very little 
in the vast majority of cases. Trustees make so little from administering chap-
ter 7 cases that, on balance, they report losing money acting as trustees,242 
money they make up partly with the occasional asset case and partly by lever-
                                                                                                                           
 236 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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aging their roles as trustees to get client referrals. In effect, at present, serving 
as a chapter 7 trustee is a loss leader.243 
Because chapter 7 trustees are under extreme time and money constraints, 
341 meetings run very short—an average of about ten minutes.244 Trustees of-
ten time the meetings and strive to keep them as short as possible, occasionally 
conducting a meeting in under three minutes.245 But absent discussions with 
their attorneys, 341 meetings are typically the only opportunities for people to 
tell their stories of financial failure. In many instances, conducting these meet-
ings so that debtors have sufficient opportunities to speak will require trustees 
to devote much more time to each meeting and to alter or augment their typical 
lines of questioning. Although trustees can organize 341 meetings such that 
debtors will feel they have a voice, trustees’ current compensation structure 
makes doing so infeasible.246 
With a revised procedure that places the burden of identifying debtors’ 
mistakes primarily on bankruptcy judges, chapter 7 trustees no longer will 
have to spend hours reviewing cases and holding 341 meetings. Bankruptcy 
judges, in part relying on their clerks, will take on many of those duties. This 
should make the baseline of $60 that chapter 7 trustees make per case more 
appropriate in light of the actual work required. If there exist assets to sell, 
judges can order trustees to do so, and trustees can continue to collect the pre-
scribed sliding scale commission from those sales. If a trustee suspects that the 
debtor’s estate includes saleable assets, even if the petition and schedules sug-
gest otherwise, the trustee can cross-examine the debtor to identify assets to 
sell. And USTs can provide another check on chapter 7 cases, similar to their 
current role. Cumulatively, debtors’ filings should receive the same scrutiny 
while allowing them to appear and speak before the bankruptcy judge. 
In contrast to chapter 7 trustees, even with a new procedure that requires 
bankruptcy judges to examine debtors, chapter 13 trustees will need to retain 
many of their current duties. At present, chapter 13 trustees’ primary responsi-
bilities are to review proposed plans, recommend whether judges should ap-
prove plans, distribute payments made under plans, and monitor debtors’ ad-
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herence to plans.247 They also examine debtors at 341 meetings.248 These du-
ties are sufficiently time-consuming that serving as chapter 13 trustees com-
prises all or most of these private attorneys’ businesses.249 Chapter 13 trustees 
make money by taking a percentage of plan payments, up to 10%, as their 
compensation.250 It is common knowledge among bankruptcy practitioners that 
this cut is enough to allow chapter 13 trustees to make low six-figure salaries 
and to hire associate attorneys and staff.251 
Under the revised procedure, bankruptcy judges will assume the lion’s 
share of chapter 13 trustees’ responsibilities in reviewing petitions and sched-
ules so they can question debtors. Judges also may question debtors and their 
attorneys about repayment plans, similarly lightening chapter 13 trustees’ load 
in reviewing these plans. But the trustees’ primary role of collecting plan pay-
ments and monitoring debtors’ adherence to plans will remain. And, like chap-
ter 7 trustees, chapter 13 trustees may want to cross-examine debtors about 
petitions, schedules, and proposed plans. 
Beyond speaking with a bankruptcy judge and trustee, some debtors may 
want their creditors to be present when they appear in court. Compelling credi-
tors to appear, however, presents problems. Most creditors will recover so little 
in consumer bankruptcy cases, even if they are owed significant amounts of 
money, that appearing in court will cost them more than the recovery they will 
realize.252 As presently conceived, bankruptcy trustees’ duties partly account 
for creditors’ anticipated lack of participation.253 
Although some debtors initially may ask that their creditors be present, 
creditor participation ultimately may not be necessary. Debtors will be able to 
tell their stories to judges and trustees, the judicial officials who will decide 
whether debtors receive the discharge or who will confirm their repayment 
plans. In telling their stories, if necessary, debtors will be able to indict their 
creditors or otherwise discuss their relationships with their creditors. Indeed, 
the bankruptcy judge embodies the court as an institution issuing the ruling 
that speaks to the debtors’ social standing. Debtors and the public should be 
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most concerned with the legitimacy of the bankruptcy judge and the procedure, 
not necessarily with whether debtors will be confronted by or be able to con-
front their creditors during the proceeding that supports this legitimacy.254 
Finally, this new procedure, of course, comes with costs. Replacing 341 
meetings with court appearances will require debtors and bankruptcy courts to 
invest more resources in the process. If they want to appear in person, debtors 
will need to travel to federal courthouses, which in some circumstances will be 
located more than a hundred miles from where debtors live. In contrast, 341 
meetings are held at a greater number of locations and typically are closer to 
debtors’ residences. Providing ways for debtors to appear telephonically, via 
video, or through an online interface will defray these costs while preserving 
the procedural justice benefits that accrue with the court appearance. 
Debtors also will have to spend more time in court discussing their fi-
nances and their need for the discharge than they presently do in 341 meetings. 
That people will spend more time telling their story is a feature of the new pro-
cedure, and likely integral to improving perceptions of consumer bankruptcy’s 
procedural justice. But this may require people to take more time off from 
work to travel and otherwise appear than they currently do to attend 341 meet-
ings. Nonetheless, considering that procedural justice research shows that peo-
ple value the opportunity to tell their stories, the time difference most likely is 
not material to debtors, particularly with phone, video, or online appearance 
options that reduce costs. 
Debtors may be more worried about the additional fees that their attor-
neys almost certainly charge to represent them during court hearings, regard-
less of whether debtors’ appearances are in person or via technology. Consum-
er bankruptcy attorneys already face significant time demands relative to the 
fees they charge their cash-strapped clients.255 Of more concern for the new 
procedure, almost all consumer bankruptcy attorneys require their clients to 
pay all fees for assisting with chapter 7 cases prior to filing because of Code 
provisions regarding payment of their fees.256 As my CBP co-investigators and 
I have discussed in prior work, these demands have resulted in attorneys creat-
ing a fee structure that seems to shift certain households from filing chapter 7 
to filing chapter 13, despite chapter 7 being the better financial choice.257 Any 
addition to attorney’s fees may further affect households’ chapter choice deci-
sions. Although attorneys still will need to charge more, in revising bankrupt-
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cy’s procedures, the Code sections governing attorney’s fees can be updated 
simultaneously to allow debtors to pay fees over time. This is a more reasona-
ble payment structure for cash-strapped debtors. 
Bankruptcy judges also will need to devote more time to preparing for 
and overseeing hearings, which will place monetary burdens on the bankruptcy 
system. But if the consumer bankruptcy system is to deliver procedural justice 
to debtors in the way it currently is conceived, these added costs are unavoida-
ble. Besides, as a matter of fostering positive perceptions of the legal system, 
the enhancement to the bankruptcy system’s integrity and effectiveness should 
more than offset the extra investment. 
B. New Deal #2: Transforming Consumer Bankruptcy into an 
Administrative Proceeding 
The second proposed “new deal for debtors” that promises to enhance 
consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice abandons the assumption that the 
system’s current laws and process should remain as intact as possible. Alt-
hough proposing a few smaller changes almost certainly is more legislatively 
feasible in the short term, more radically reconfiguring the consumer bank-
ruptcy system presents an efficient way to improve the system’s procedural 
justice and effectiveness over the long term. Indeed, the first proposal with 
minimal changes to existing procedure brings concerns about higher attorney’s 
fees and additional burdens on the federal courts. 
A way to navigate both of these concerns is to take cues from 341 meet-
ings and from the history of the consumer bankruptcy system. Meeting loca-
tions are more widespread than bankruptcy courthouses, meaning that debtors 
need to travel shorter distances. Meetings also are relatively short, though 
presently too short.258 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,259 which enacted 
the present-day Bankruptcy Code (as updated by BAPCPA), dramatically al-
tered the structure of the bankruptcy court system. Prior to the Code, under the 
1898 Bankruptcy Act,260 bankruptcy cases were adjudicated by bankruptcy 
referees, who were overseen by district judges and courts.261 Bankruptcy refer-
                                                                                                                           
 258 See supra notes 238–245 and accompanying text. 
 259 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1979). The Act became 
effective as of October 1, 1979. 
 260 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). 
 261 See Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 12 (2012) (not-
ing that at “[t]he end of the nineteenth century . . . modern bankruptcy came into being with its system 
of referees appointed by district courts”). 
2019] Procedural Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy 2343 
ees were the equivalent of today’s bankruptcy judges, but with fewer pow-
ers.262 
For the purpose of reimagining consumer bankruptcy to enhance its pro-
cedural justice, the key takeaway from the bankruptcy referee system is that it 
can be conceptualized as a hybrid of today’s bankruptcy courts and an admin-
istrative agency. In fact, at the same time as the referee system came into be-
ing, Congress was creating administrative agencies to oversee private dis-
putes.263 Instead of the system that eventually became the modern bankruptcy 
courts, Congress could have put into place an administrative agency to oversee 
bankruptcy cases, either both consumer and business cases or only consumer 
cases. And, at present, the consumer bankruptcy docket looks more like that of 
an administrative agency than a federal court.264 
Rather than take bankruptcy courts, bankruptcy judges, and the Code as 
given, drawing from this history, the current consumer bankruptcy system can 
be replaced with an administrative agency that runs administrative courts 
which oversee the revised bankruptcy laws that govern consumer debtors’ dis-
charges.265 The agency’s exact contours and the accompanying laws are open 
to development. But the agency, its process, and the “deal” offered to debtors 
should include a few important elements. 
Procedurally, the new system must engender feelings of trust and integrity 
in debtors and the public. To achieve this, as procedural justice research teach-
es, debtors must have the opportunity to tell their stories of overindebtedness 
to the ultimate decisionmakers overseeing the proceedings. This opportunity 
can come in different forms—in person, via telephone or video conference, or 
through an online interface. 
For people who want to appear in person before the administrative court 
officer, the agency can provide a hearing that operates very much like 341 
meetings, but with the clear requirement that debtors have a sufficient chance 
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to tell their stories. To address concerns about how far people must travel to 
attend the hearings, they should be held in locations across the country, though 
the administrative agency itself can have fewer offices nationwide. 
In addition, replacing federal bankruptcy courts with an administrative 
agency presents the opportunity to affirmatively encourage hearings conducted 
by telephone or via video conference, which will reduce costs. It also allows 
for the design of a system that relies heavily on online interfaces for people to 
submit materials and write narratives, similar to the CFPB’s consumer com-
plaint mechanism.266 Courts across America increasingly use online interfaces 
to facilitate the resolution of simple disputes, such as parking tickets, contract 
issues, and some divorces.267 These courts’ initiatives have proven to be cost-
effective and to increase people’s access to justice.268 Updating consumer 
bankruptcy’s technology is a natural extension of these initiatives that similarly 
should enhance procedural justice. 
The revised consumer bankruptcy system’s substantive laws must address 
concerns about people’s ability to retain counsel and to understand how their 
cases will proceed and how they will receive the discharge. Simplifying bank-
ruptcy laws will make it easier for attorneys to represent debtors and for debt-
ors to represent themselves, particularly combined with consumer-friendly 
online interfaces to submit materials. 
One way to reduce consumer bankruptcy’s substantive complexity is to 
provide for only one chapter under which the typical consumer with household 
debts can file. This chapter should collapse chapter 7 and chapter 13, retaining 
each chapter’s most useful provisions and jettisoning troublesome elements. 
Versions of this idea have been raised occasionally during the past several dec-
ades as scholars have exposed and confirmed flaws in the Code’s chapter 7 and 
13 structure.269 A single chapter can easily retain key elements of both chap-
ters—a relatively fast discharge of unsecured debts and longer-term agree-
ments for secured debts, such as houses and automobiles.270 
Ultimately, regardless of the exact changes to the consumer bankruptcy 
system, the benefits of strengthening consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice 
should more than offset the costs of requiring consumers to appear in some 
                                                                                                                           
 266 See supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text. 
 267 See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies Through E-Court Initiatives, 67 
BUFF. L. REV. 89 (2019) (discussing courts’ online dispute resolution initiatives). 
 268 See id. at 90, 93–94 (discussing the effectiveness of online dispute resolution procedures). 
 269 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy’s Home Economics, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
43, 56 (2004) (discussing Elizabeth Warren’s The New Economics of the American Family and noting 
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 270 See supra notes 94–119 and accompanying text. 
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way before the judicial official who will decide whether they receive the dis-
charge. Procedural justice research, combined with what we know about the 
people who turn to bankruptcy for help, strongly suggests that consumer debt-
ors crave more of a voice during their bankruptcy cases. In turn, providing fi-
nancially struggling households with richer opportunities to feel heard promis-
es to strengthen people’s post-bankruptcy experiences and bolster their re-entry 
into the credit economy. 
CONCLUSION: TESTING BANKRUPTCY’S PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Across the legal system, people use legal procedures and outcomes to as-
sess their value as members of society and to deal with the emotions arising 
from serious events in their lives. Facing debts to the point of being unable to 
repay absent a miracle is disastrous and a threat to people’s social identities. 
Research regarding procedural justice and the expressive value of legal pro-
ceedings suggests that people want bankruptcy to provide a public referendum 
that allows debtors to reaffirm their social standing (which has been tarnished 
by their overindebtedness) and, relatedly, to cope with the negative emotions 
arising from their financial situations and interaction with creditors. 
Although some data exist in support of this Article’s theory of consumer 
bankruptcy’s lack of procedural justice, to fully assess the hypotheses that un-
derlie the theory, researchers must undertake more targeted empirical studies 
of the system. These studies should involve people struggling with their debts 
and assess the lived experience of overindebtedness, including how people 
think about their creditors and the options they have to regain their financial 
footing. Qualitative, semi-structured interview-based research, as has been un-
dertaken in the context of bankruptcy’s stigma,271 will likely provide useful 
data to begin to understand what people think they will receive from bankrupt-
cy’s procedures. Follow-up or separate studies similarly should ask debtors 
after they have completed their bankruptcy cases whether bankruptcy’s proce-
dures lived up to their expectations, and if not, about the effect of the discon-
nect between their expectations and reality. 
Likewise, questionnaire-based studies drawing from pools of overindebt-
ed consumers and similar pools of non-indebted consumers should yield in-
sights into people’s thoughts about dealing with overindebtedness and percep-
tions of bankruptcy’s procedures. As used to assess procedural justice and ex-
pressive theories of law in other contexts, these studies can employ hypothet-
ical vignettes to reveal people’s thoughts and feelings. One of the keys to these 
studies, of course, will be to identify groups of people to survey. Given the link 
                                                                                                                           
 271 See generally Sousa, supra note 61 (conducting interviews with debtors regarding bankrupt-
cy’s stigma); Thorne & Anderson, supra note 180 (noting that most debtors have a desire to pay). 
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between debt collection pressures and people’s decisions to file bankruptcy, 
state court debt collection proceedings offer a place to begin this research. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of understanding how people as-
sess the fairness and legitimacy of the consumer bankruptcy system. The bank-
ruptcy system is by far the part of the federal court system that people most 
often use. We know very little about what people expect to gain from the bank-
ruptcy process beyond the obvious financial benefits. Given that research 
shows that people view the outcomes and proceedings of other parts of the le-
gal system as referendums on their social status, people very likely view the 
bankruptcy system, in part, as a place to assess and assert their social standing. 
If consumer bankruptcy truly is procedurally bankrupt, then the “fresh start” 
delivered through the discharge and through repayment plans is not as fresh as 
presumed. This realization has important consequences for people’s return to 
their communities and to the credit economy. It is crucial now to assess and 
refine this Article’s theory of consumer bankruptcy’s procedural justice defi-
ciencies, and then act to reform the deal that consumer debtors receive through 
the bankruptcy system. 
